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Through detailed review of the primary sources, this thesis provides a thematic and historical 
picture of the law of the seller’s liability for the sale of faulty goods, and attempts to describe 
the boundaries and developments of the legal tools available to the aggrieved purchaser. 
The thesis begins with an outline of the various routes to liability in classical and Justinianic 
Roman law, and goes on to show how these forms of liability were understood by early Scots 
law. It then divides discussion of the Scots law into four principal periods, beginning with the 
law described by Stair and ending with the modern system of concomitant liability under the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979 as amended and for error induced by misrepresentation.  
It is concluded that liability for sale of faulty goods has existed in various forms throughout 
the modern era of Scots law: firstly, in fraud, or presumed fraud; then in the terms of the 
contract; then in statute or in error after the recognition of a doctrine of innocent 
misrepresentation. It is argued that error was not in Scots law a historically relevant means of 
redress in sales of faulty goods.  
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The law surrounding the seller’s obligations as to the quality of goods supplied to a buyer has 
been described as being at “the very heart of the law of sale”1. However, surprisingly little has 
been written about the development of the law, taking into account the various different forms 
of redress open to the buyer. The main purpose of this thesis is to ask the question: how did 
Scots law historically, and how does it presently, deal with the claims about the sale of faulty 
goods?  
The approach taken by this thesis is to ascertain as far as practicable from the sources what 
sorts of tools were available to aggrieved buyers of faulty goods in various periods in Scots 
law since Stair, and to group them chronologically in terms of their doctrinal basis. This is no 
easy task: “[a]t any moment in time there might have been – almost certainly would have been 
– competing frameworks held by different lawyers, perhaps even by the same lawyers, for few 
of us manage to maintain a harmonious self-consistency all the time”2. As the focus of this 
thesis is legal history in its strict sense, it leaves open the possibility for further study on the 
wider socio-economic and ideological reasons for the changes that might be observed within 
the law. 
The results show that, as with many areas of law, there is no one trend that can usefully be 
articulated to explain all of the developmental changes in the law. Ibbetson suggests that much 
of the change occurring in the black-letter law is “friction between legal frameworks”3 and this 
seems especially apposite in cases of sale of faulty goods, in which significant developments 
arise not from some monolithic force but from the gradual shifts in perception resulting from 
what could almost be described as entropy. Some of the detail provided in this thesis may 
therefore seem at times spurious and at other times trivial or unconnected, but such details are 
recorded here because they are in fact significant, albeit as part of a broader weave of rules 
that ultimately culminate in the modern Scots law on the liability of the seller of faulty goods. 
                                                
1 Atiyah, Adams and MacQueen, Sale of Goods (Dorset, 2005), 164. 
2 Ibbetson, ‘What Is Legal History a History Of?’ in Lewis and Lobban (eds), Law and history (Oxford, 2004), 36. 
3 Ibid, 36. 
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The thesis will be divided into six chapters. The first chapter will set out a brief description of 
the principles of Roman law that provided redress for the buyer of faulty goods. The 
discussion is intended to provide the necessary context before considering Stair’s analysis, 
which will be dealt with in the next chapter, as well as providing a picture of the various 
routes to liability.  
The second chapter will discuss the period from the publication of Stair’s Institutions (in 
1681) until the mid-18th century, during which liability was primarily delictual in nature. This 
chapter will show how Stair’s assessment of liability for insufficiency invoked the language of 
the aedilitian actions of Roman law, but that his discussion was far from a direct import of 
those actions into Scots law, resting as it did on the concepts of fraud and culpa lata – the 
equivalent of fraud. It will also discuss the potential for liability in error under Stair. Error is 
conceived by Stair as the invalidation of the subjective consensus required to create a contract, 
such as where there was error in substantia, as under Roman law. However, this chapter will 
show that there is no connection made by Stair between error in substantials and the sale of 
faulty goods, and it is doubted whether Stair would have contemplated the relevance of error 
in cases of merely faulty goods. 
Chapter three will discuss the period from the mid-18th century until the start of the 19th 
century, which is a period characterised by doctrinal friction. During this period liability was 
described in terms of a warrandice, whether expressed or implied, suggesting that liability 
rested on a kind of legal fiction that the seller had guaranteed the quality of the goods. 
However, there was still some vacillation over whether breach of the implied warrandice was 
to be viewed in terms of fraud, with the word warrandice in some cases being just as a label 
for that kind of liability – although neither of these competing frameworks was dominant 
during this period. This chapter will also show that there is still no evidence that error would 
provide a relevant ground for liability in the context of merely faulty goods. 
The fourth chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will discuss the period from 
the start of the 19th century to the middle of the 19th century, showing that, by this time, 
liability for the sale of faulty goods in the absence of evidence of knowledge of the fault is 
generally no longer regarded as fraud. Instead, the view that liability arose as a condition of 
the contract emerged as the dominant narrative. This chapter will also discuss error, which was 
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given a more prominent role in the Institutional works, arguing that that it is doubtful whether 
either Hume or Bell contemplated use of a doctrine of error in cases of merely faulty goods.  
The second part deals with the law from the middle of the 19th century to the end of the 19th 
century, which saw statutory intervention undo many of the developments of the last century. 
In the 1850s, an agenda of law reform was consulted upon, leading ultimately to the 
Mercantile Law Amendment Scotland Act 1856, which amongst other things abolished the 
implied warranty of quality in sales of goods. It will be shown that the case law discloses a 
fairly uniform interpretation of the terms of the 1856 Act, and ultimately the rejection of many 
claims falling foul of its provisions – and that, again, error is irrelevant to sales of faulty goods. 
The penultimate and final chapters deal with the period from the end of the 19th century until 
the present. The former is about the seller’s statutory liability to provide goods of a certain 
quality or fit for certain purposes. This discussion will focus on the more important changes 
and amendments introduced by various rounds of legislation, suggesting that although it 
started off broadly codifying the English common law (which provided only limited basis for 
redress against a seller), it has now come full-circle in cases of consumer sales by imposing 
liability for selling faulty goods regardless of the agreement of the parties. 
The last chapter is about liability for error induced by misrepresentation, which (as is 
demonstrated by chapters two, three and four) was not a historical category applicable to the 
seller of faulty goods. The embryonic stages of development of this doctrine can be found in 
cases of sale of heritable property in the early-19th century, and it ultimately emerged in the 
late-19th century as a principle of general applicability to contracts where one contracting party 
had induced the other party to contract by giving false information about the subject matter of 
their agreement. Liability on this basis is able to run concurrently with liability arising from 
the statutorily implied terms, and representations might be regarded as an express warranty 
under certain circumstances. It will be seen that there is no general common law liability in 
misrepresentation merely for selling faulty goods, but that the appearance of the goods might 
constitute a representation of their sufficiency. Thus if the appearance of the goods is 
misleading, and induces the buyer to contract, the seller might be liable to restore the price, or 
even give damages in certain cases. 
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CHAPTER 1: LIABILITY FOR FAULTS IN ROMAN LAW 
This chapter sets out a brief discussion of the bases of liability for selling faulty goods under 
Roman law, both under the civil law and under the curule aediles’ edictal actions. Its purpose 
is to provide the necessary background knowledge and context to understand the position 
adopted by Stair, and how it differed from what follows.  
In summary, there were four main routes to liability developed by the Roman jurists, each of 
which will be discussed below4.  
Firstly, there was the stipulatio, which was a strictly interpreted express promise by the seller. 
Secondly, the seller was perhaps guilty of fraud (dolus) if he knew of the defect and either 
concealed it or failed to disclose it. Thirdly, a seller who informally represented facts about the 
goods (dicta promissave) would be held liable for the correctness of those statements. These 
three forms of liability were not limited to defects in the sale of goods, and were of more 
general application. The latter two – enforceable through the general action on the sale (actio 
empti) – were derived from the notion of contracts bona fides, and are thus concerned with the 
prevention of frauds5.  
The fourth form of liability is the only one that directly addresses faulty goods: liability under 
the curule aediles’ actions. These actions were available in very limited circumstances, and 
presided over by the aediles exercising a quasi-regulatory function6. These so-called aedilitian 
actions were also about preventing frauds, but this was more an inherent structural focus than 
a practical agenda. Furthermore, their availability was limited to faults appearing on a set of 
                                                
4 See generally, Stein, ‘Medieval Discussions of the Buyer’s Actions for Physical Defects’ in Daube (ed), Studies 
in the Roman Law of Sale (Oxford, 1959); Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects in Roman and 
English Law’ in Daube (ed), Studies in the Roman Law of Sale (Oxford, 1959); Honoré, ‘The History of the 
Aedilitian Actions from Roman to Roman-Dutch Law’ in Daube (ed), Studies in the Roman Law of Sale (Oxford, 
1959); Moyle, The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law: With References to the Laws of England, Scotland and 
France (Oxford, 1892), chap 6, 12; Monier, La Garantier Contre Les Vices Cachés Dans La Vente Romaine 
(Paris, 1930). 
5 Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 135. 
6 Monier, La Garantier Contre Les Vices Cachés Dans La Vente Romaine, 28–29. 
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enumerated lists, which concerned only slaves and beasts of burden7. Unlike the stipulatio and 
the actio empti, there was no possibility of general application. Liability under the aedilician 
edict provided two remedies depending on circumstances: the actio redhibitoria, which might 
be equated with the modern Scots law remedy of rescission followed by rejection; and the 
actio quanti minoris, which allowed the buyer an appropriate reduction in the price of the sale8.  
Fifthly, and finally, there is some suggestion that an enlarged concept of error in substantia 
under the law of Justinian might have provided the buyer of faulty goods with a remedy on the 
basis that his intention was not directed towards buying the goods in question9. 
CIVIL LIABILITY IN EARLY ROMAN LAW 
In early Roman law, there was little by way of protection for the buyer of faulty goods except 
insofar as they fell within the aediles’ edictal jurisdiction10. At the time when the aediles’ edict 
was first introduced – perhaps the year 199BC11 – it is unlikely that liability for the sale of 
defective goods “could be based on any legal ground other than stipulatio”12. This would have 
required the buyer to ask the seller to stipulate the existence or non-existence of a particular 
feature, and for the seller to respond with the same words, and in particular the same verb (in 
early law, specifically the verb spondeo). It was a contract stricti iuris rather than bona fides, 
and would be taken literally, excluding any implied meanings or terms13. The stipulation was 
often put into writing for evidential purposes, and gradually over time the written form 
                                                
7 Ibid, 33–39, 46–48; Moyle, The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 192–3. 
8 Cf. Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 124–5. 
9 Stein, Fault in the Formation of Contract in Roman Law and Scots Law (Edinburgh, 1958), 60. 
10 See below, page 7ff. 
11 Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 134. 
12 Ibid, 135. 
13 Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 1st ed (Cape Town, 
1992), 68–94. 
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became presumptive proof of the fact that the stipulation had occurred14. By the time of 
Justinian, the only way of escaping proposed liability under a written document evidencing a 
stipulation was to show that one of the parties had not been in the same town at the time the 
document was created. It had thus become analogous to what we now call a written contract15. 
However, by the end of the Roman Republic the civil law had developed two mechanisms that 
could be applied to the seller of faulty goods in the absence of expressly negotiated agreement. 
Firstly, the notion of dolus – a sort of antonym of the idea of bona fides – “was extended to 
cover both the statement by the seller that the thing sold possessed or did not possess some 
quality when he knew this was untrue and also the case when the seller knowingly concealed a 
defect”16. This could, of course, lead to the breach of an express stipulation, but the important 
feature of this form of liability was that it could exist where no promise has taken place – or 
even where nothing had been said at all. 
Secondly, with the recognition of contracts bona fide came recognition of liability for pre-
contractual statements (dicta promissave) made informally. Liability on this ground arose 
from “the terms of the contract of emptio venditio itself”17, and would thus be considered 
analogous with what modern Scots lawyers might recognise as express warranty or 
misrepresentation. Liability for dicta promissave extended only to sufficiently serious matters, 
thus excluding any sales “puff” used by the seller. 
Liability for dolus in knowingly selling faulty goods was enforceable through the actio empti 
(action on the sale). This would have been an action for damages: a contract of emptio venditio 
implied the stipulatio duplae18. There was at one time some doubt whether liability for dicta 
                                                
14 Ibid, 78–82. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 135. 
17 Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 112. 
18 Zimmermann, Obligations, 296–8. 
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promissave was applied “to all sales and enforced by the actio empti”19 before Justinian, or 
was only available under the edict20. However, recent research has suggested that such liability 
was gradually introduced before the time of Justinian21. 
AEDILICIAN LIABILITY IN EARLY ROMAN LAW 
As well as liability under civil law, which was not directed in particular towards the seller of 
faulty goods, there was also a specific type of liability specifically for the protection of the 
buyer of faulty goods: liability under the curule aediles’ edict. Before looking at the scope and 
remedies available under the edict, it is important to note that the curule aediles were, above 
all, a sort of police of the public streets and of the market halls. It is with this quality in which 
they intervened in the private sales of slaves, and later animals22, made at market, and their 
purpose was the prevention and redress of frauds committed by the sellers upon the buyers23. 
It is not clear why it was felt necessary to begin to regulate these particular types of sale24, but 
history (or perhaps comedy25) shows that slave dealers – often peregrines – were of doubtful 
morality, and may therefore have been more likely to seek to trick their buyers. In any case, 
the curule aediles’ edictal jurisdiction clearly fell outside the civil law, and was of an 
administrative or regulatory nature26. The reasons for their intervention against frauds at 
                                                
19 Nicholas, ‘Dicta Promissave’ in Daube (ed), Studies in the Roman Law of Sale (Oxford, 1959), 91. 
20 Pugsley, ‘The Aedilician Edict’ in Watson (ed), Daube Noster: Essays in Legal History for David Daube 
(Edinburgh, 1974), 254–255. 
21 Zimmermann, Obligations, 321. 
22 First of iumenta (beasts of burden), and then of pecora (livestock): Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent 
Defects’, 116. 
23 Monier, La Garantier Contre Les Vices Cachés Dans La Vente Romaine, 28. 
24 Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 116. 
25 Monier cites Plautus’ comedies: Monier, La Garantier Contre Les Vices Cachés Dans La Vente Romaine, 29. 
26 Moyle, The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 189. 
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marketplaces was probably borne from the same ideas that would later develop into the notion 
of bona fides, but their concern with it was more practical than doctrinal. 
The aediles’ edict certainly did not create any sort of general liability for faults: as stated 
above, it applied only to the sale of slaves, although was later expanded to include certain 
kinds of animal; it applied only where the goods were sold at a marketplace; and it only 
provided redress in respect of certain kinds of latent defect. Of slaves, the edict de iumentis 
vendundis provided liability for defects falling under three main categories: first, physical 
defects and vices of the slave; second, particular moral vices of the slave; and finally, a 
juridical vice which might permit an action against the owner of the slave by a third party for 
wrongs done by that slave27. In respect of animals, the later edict de iumentis vendundis, which 
was later extended to include pecora, only provided for the first two categories of defect: 
physical defects and vices of character28. 
Although later Ulpian would extend the scope of defects for which the seller was liable under 
the aediles’ edict to include those covered by any dicta promissave of the seller29, the 
significance of the early forms of this seemingly very limited form of liability cannot be 
overlooked. It will be recalled that, even by the end of the late-classical period, the civil law 
did not impose liability unless the seller had acted fraudulently, or had expressly represented 
the goods as having certain qualities30. The aediles’ edict therefore represented an important 
form of protection for the buyer. While the concept of fraud included the seller’s knowledge, 
at the time of the contract, “of defects in the goods which would impair their utility for the 
purpose for which they were intended, and deliberately abstained from giving such 
                                                
27 Monier, La Garantier Contre Les Vices Cachés Dans La Vente Romaine, 32–9. 
28 Ibid, 32, 48. Cf. Moyle, The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 196–7. 
29 Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 140. It remains unclear whether the standard expected of the seller 
in this case was “to be the civil law rather than the sense of justice and commercial convenience of the Aediles or 
the iudex”: Nicholas, ‘Dicta Promissave’, 96. 
30 Stein, ‘Medieval Discussions of the Buyer’s Actions for Physical Defects’, 102; Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty 
against Latent Defects’, 112–113. 
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information to the purchaser”31, it still required the seller to prove scientia32. Thus the trigger 
for civil liability was not the fault affecting the goods but either the action or inaction of the 
seller in a position of knowledge, in which perhaps the existence of the fault played some role, 
or his promise33. Similarly, the first versions of the edict did not impose liability simply for the 
sale of defective goods: the seller was required by the aediles to expressly promise the absence 
of certain faults within two months of the sale on pain of redhibition34. After the promise was 
given, if the buyer discovered that the goods suffered from an edictal fault that was the subject 
of the seller’s promise (within six months of the sale) then the seller was simply held to his 
word. This requirement was varied through time, and an important aspect of the development 
of aedilitian liability in classical law was the imposition of a form of strict liability that held 
the seller liable to the same extent even if he did not make any express declaration35. The 
ability of a buyer to compel the seller to promise the absence of edictal faults could have 
introduced the notion that the seller would be liable whether or not the faults were reasonably 
discoverable36. Rogerson argues that it was in these developments – both “outside the civil law 
and clearly of narrow scope” – from which “springs the greatest part of the law imposing 
defects in the absence of fraud or of express promise” 37. Thus, while it is “perhaps a little 
misleading”38 to describe such aedilitian liability as an implied warranty, there is at least some 
merit in the analogy.  
                                                
31 Moyle, The Contract of Sale in the Civil Law, 191. 
32 Stein, Fault, 15. 
33 Cf. Honoré, who points to “strong evidence” that the actio empti comprehended an implied term that the thing 
sold was not useless: Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 144. 
34 See Nicholas, ‘Dicta Promissave’; Pugsley, ‘The Aedilician Edict’, 260. 
35 Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 116. 
36 Honoré, ‘History of the Aedilitian Actions’, 136. 
37 Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 117. 
38 Ibid, 116. 
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The aediles’ edict was enforced through two special actions: the actio redhibitoria and the 
actio quanti minoris, both of which were intended to be restorative rather than compensatory 
remedies. As stated above, the former could be sought within six months of the date of the sale. 
It allowed for the reversal of the sale “and all its effects”39. The latter lay for a period of 
twelve months, and permitted the buyer to seek a reduction in the sale price. Neither provided 
for a claim of consequential damages. During the six month period in which the actio 
rehibitioria and the actio quanti minoris were said to be available, “it appears that the buyer 
could choose which remedy he liked, subject to a rule that redhibition and not mere reduction 
of the price must be claimed when the defect was such as to make the object worthless”40. 
LIABILITY UNDER THE LAW OF JUSTINIAN 
By the time of the compilation of the corpus iuris civilis the aediles’ edict had been extended 
to cover all sales, not just those of slaves or beasts41. Furthermore, as mentioned above, edictal 
liability had been extended from a fixed list of faults specific to certain goods to include 
liability where the seller had expressly represented the existence or non-existence of a 
particular feature of the goods by way of a dictum promissumve, provided that the thing 
complained of was sufficiently serious. 
Moreover, with the disappearance of the formulary system in the year 342AD42, it was 
possible to bring questions of aedilitian liability before any court. Then, “what seems to have 
happened is that the principles laid down in the aedilician43 edict were gradually received into 
                                                
39 Stein, Fault, 15. 
40 See generally, Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 123–4. 
41 Stein, Fault, 56; Zimmermann, Obligations, 321.  
42 Codex Justinianus 2.57.1 (Blume’s annotated English translation, published posthumously, can be found at 
http://www.uwyo.edu/lawlib/blume-justinian/_files/docs/book-2pdf/book%202-57.pdf, correct as at 30 March 
2015), see also OF Robinson, The Sources of Roman Law: Problems and Methods for Ancient Historians (2006), 
63ff. 
43 There are at least three variants of how to spell this word, the preferred choice in this thesis being “aedilitian”, 
the others being: “aedilician” (as used by Zimmerman in the present quote); and “aedilicean”, which appears in 
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the ius civile”44 and thereafter restated by Justinian without much modification. Stein gives a 
detailed picture of the ‘reception’ of the aedilitian liability by the civil law, the effect of which 
was to promote the edictal rules to “one of the duties of the seller, arising ipso jure from the 
contract”.45 Nonetheless the rule was, according to Stein, still seen as one that was for the 
prevention of frauds: 
For in general the Byzantines moved away from ‘objective liability’. They saw a fault, 
less serious than dolus and more akin to culpa, in the fact that the seller was not 
familiar with what he was selling. It was this fault that they sanctioned by allowing an 
action against the seller of a defective thing, even though he was ignorant of the 
defect.46 
Thus the effects of the actio redhibitoria aut quanti minoris could, under Justinian’s law, be 
achieved through an application of the actio empti. After this point the main differences 
between liability for fraud or breach of promise and liability for faulty goods that would have 
previously arisen from the edict, were: that the former provided the buyer with a claim for 
damages, where the latter was rescissory in nature; and that the former was concerned with 
dolus whereas the latter did not depend on it47.  
Stein also suggests that “some cases […] were in the law of Justinian covered by an enlarged 
conception of error in substantia” which might have allowed the buyer to claim that the sale 
was void and thus recover the price paid48. Sale in Justinianic law “was concluded by 
                                                                                                                                                    
the title of Watson, ‘The Imperatives of the Aedilicean Edict’ (1971) 39(1) TvR 73-83 (although this latter 
spelling is probably an error – the body of the article uses the alternative spelling “aedilician”). 
44 Zimmermann, Obligations, 321. 
45 Stein, Fault, 54–59. See also, Rogerson, ‘Implied Warranty against Latent Defects’, 123; Zimmermann, 
Obligations, 321; Robin Evans-Jones, ‘Actio Quanti Minoris’ (1991) JR 190 at 190. 
46 Stein, Fault, 59. 
47 Stein notes that, “There is also a text which suggests that if the action is brought for redhibition, and the 
defender disobeys the judge’s order to repay the price and take back the thing, he is condemned to double 
damages”, citing D.19.1.13: Ibid, 60. 
48 Ibid, 60. 
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subjective consensus on certain matters which were later classified as essentialia or 
substantialia negotii” 49. An error as to one or more of these matters meant that there was no 
consensus ad idem – in other words, that “there could be no sale”50 – and therefore the buyer 
could recover the price by way of condictio. Such errors could include: errors as to the price 
(error in pretio), errors as to the identity of the other contracting party (error in persona), 
errors as to the identity of the object (error in corpore), error as to the kind of agreement 
(error in negotio), and error as to the quality of the object (error in substantia). Some kinds of 
faults clearly fall into the domain of error in substantia. Examples of such error given in the 
Digest include vinegar sold as wine, copper sold as lead, and something that looks like silver 
being sold as silver51. Whether lesser faults were comprehended as such is not clear. While 
MacLeod notes that, to modern eyes, these examples do not seem to affect any of the 
essentialia or substantialia of the sale, and instead concern an “external reality, independent of 
the parties’ minds”52, such issues were probably not the concern of the Roman lawyers. 
In summary, this discussion has not attempted to give a detailed treatment of the complex 
development of Roman law, which could fill at least a study in its own right, but instead to 
give a brief outline of the various forms of liability that existed at various points in legal 
history. The relevant types of liability discussed were five-fold:  
1. Compensatory liability for express statements under the stipulatio; 
2. Compensatory liability for dolus consisting of knowing of and concealing a defect, or 
of failing to disclose defects the buyer could not ascertain through inspection; 
3. Compensatory liability for express statements coincident with the sale which confirm 
or deny the existence of particular features of the goods (dicta promissave); 
4. Restitutionary liability for failing to disclose latent edictal faults affecting the goods, 
whether or not the seller was aware of them; and 
                                                
49 John MacLeod, ‘Before Bell: The Roots of Error in the Scots Law of Contract’ (2010) 14 EdinLR 385 at 388. 
50 Ibid, at 388. 
51 D.18.1.9.2, 18.1.42. 
52 MacLeod, ‘Before Bell’, at 388. 
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5. Voidness of the contract of sale arising from an error in substantia. 
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CHAPTER 2: FRAUD AND INSUFFICIENCY 
In the early case law from the time of Stair, liability for the sale of faulty goods was often 
couched in terms of the insufficiency of the goods. As with the actio empti of Justinianic 
Roman law, the seller was liable as a result of deceit where he did not disclose the existence of 
a fault affecting the goods, or concealed it. Again, scientia went to the availability of damages: 
the innocent seller of faulty goods seems to have been presumed to have known the fault, 
provided that the fault appeared within an arbitrary time following the sale. Patent faults were 
excluded, but only if the buyer had an opportunity to inspect the goods prior to the sale.  
STAIR 
At the point Stair was writing, reference to Roman law was common practice in instances 
where Scots law did not provide an answer. Stair seems to have regarded Roman law as “a 
source of ideas and as persuasive authority”53, but he did not do so uncritically. Gordon 
suggests that, “[a] close reading of Stair’s text shows that even where he might appear at first 
sight to be relying on Roman law he is instead testing it against natural law”54. Furthermore, 
even in cases where Stair does refer to the Roman law, it must be added that his understanding 
of it would have been influenced by the ius commune writers, whose understanding of the 
Roman categories of error and the extent to which they were themselves influenced by 
Aristotlean metaphysics remains “a matter of controversy”55. Thus while Stair’s scheme of 
remedies for the buyer of faulty goods might appear similar to that of the law under the corpus 
iuris, there are some significant differences, with one important advance being that liability for 
latent insufficiency now expressly falls under the law of fraud. 
 
                                                
53 Gordon, ‘Roman Law in Scotland’ in Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland (Edinburgh, 1995), 
27. 
54 Ibid, 28. 
55 MacLeod, ‘Before Bell’, at 323. 
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Stair provides three mechanisms of liability for the seller of defective goods, which generally 
follow the Roman rules as stated above. Firstly, the seller may have either expressly or 
implicitly represented to the buyer the existence or non-existence of a particular feature of the 
goods, which may then be considered as a part of the agreement or as a separate promise. 
Secondly, the seller may be liable in delict (ex delicto) for fraud, either by intentionally 
misrepresenting (or actively concealing) a fault from the buyer, or as a result of concealment 
or non-disclosure of a latent defect from inexcusable ignorance. The extent of the seller’s 
liability depended on whether or not he knew of the fault. Finally, there may be an error 
affecting the sale and thereby annulling the parties’ consent. Each will now be dealt with in 
turn. 
Contract as the source of obligations 
Stair provides that the contract of sale is “perfected, according to law and our custom, by sole 
consent, naked pactions being now efficacious; and though neither of the things exchanged be 
delivered, the agreement is valid”56. He later observes that in all contracts, “not only that 
which is expressed must be performed, but that which is necessarily consequent and 
implied”57. Thus there is recognition that ‘terms’ may be express as well as implied. Stair 
continues, “in nominate contracts, law hath determined these implications”. In the context of 
the contract of sale, we are not told whether the relevant naturalia negotii included an 
obligation to provide goods of satisfactory quality, or similar obligation, as would be the 
approach familiar to modern Scots lawyers. 
There is however no generalised concept of breach of contract as there is in modern Scots 
law58. Specifically addressing the liability of the seller of faulty goods under the title dealing 
with ‘Obligations Conventional etc’, Stair says: 
                                                
56 Stair, Inst., i.10.63. 
57 Stair, Inst., i.10.12. 
58 See e.g. Johnston, ‘Breach of Contract’ in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 
2 vols (Oxford, 2000), vol 2. 
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This agreeth with our custom, by which only a latent insufficiency of the goods 
and ware, at the time of the sale and delivery, is sufficient to abate or take down 
the price, but not unless when the insufficiency appeared, the thing bought be 
offered to be restored (if it be not carried abroad before the insufficiency appear) 
after which, retention is accounted an acquiescence in, and homologation of the 
contract.59 
The above passage directly refers back to the previous title on ‘Reparation’, and the parts 
dealing with fraud, which further explain the significance of latent insufficiency. Following 
these references, in a passage dealing with permutative contracts, we find Stair’s argument 
that, 
[I]f any party hath disadvantage by fraud or guile, it ought to be repaired; but not 
by virtue of the contract, but from the obligation arising from that delinquence: 
and so ‘unjust balances are an abomination to the Lord,’ because of the deceit 
thence arising.60 
Amongst examples of such deceit Stair lists latent insufficiency or “defect which was not 
obvious and easily perceivable by the acquirer” which give rise to a “presumption of fraud”61. 
Thus liability for sale of goods attended with a latent insufficiency is the domain of delict, 
reparable “because of the deceit thence arising” rather than flowing from the contract itself62.  
If liability for latent insufficiency is the domain of delict, then, argues Stein, it follows that 
“the action for damages is in reparation, not contract”63. It is doubtful that Stair made such a 
distinction. Stair’s discussion of the relationship between the different factual circumstances 
that might give the buyer a valid claim is found under the title dealing with ‘Sale, or Emption 
and Vendition’. Here he expressly refers to a passage from Florentinus at D.18.1.43, which 
deals with liability of the seller under the actio empti for statements made at the time of the 
sale (dicta promissave): 
                                                
59 Stair, Inst., i.10.15. 
60 Stair, Inst., i.9.11. 
61 Stair, Inst., i.10.14. 
62 Stair, Inst., i.9.14. 
63 Stein, Fault, 174. 
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Whatever a vendor says at the time of the sale to commend his merchandise 
imposes no liability upon him, if its content be obvious, say, that the slave is 
handsome or a house well built. But if he assert that a slave is well educated or a 
craftsman, he must make that good; for he obtains a higher price in consequence. 
1. There are, further, even some undertaking which do not bind the vendor, the 
case being such that the purchaser cannot be unaware of the facts; an instance is 
that of one buying a slave who has lost his eyes and stipulating for his soundness 
in which case, the stipulation is taken to refer to the rest of his body rather than to 
that in respect of which the purchaser has deceived himself. 
2. The vendor must guarantee that he is free of fraud, which comprises not merely 
the use of obscure language in order to deceive, but also circumventing 
concealment.64 
Stair incorporates the effects of the above passage with modifications as an extension to the 
liability of the seller for latent insufficiency: 
[…I]f there be any latent vitiosity, if it impede the use of the thing bought, the 
Romans gave actionem redhibitoriam, to restore and annul the bargain, or quanti 
minoris, for making up the buyer’s interest: but if the seller was ignorant of the 
vitiosity, or insufficiency, he is not liable to make it good, unless he affirm it to be 
free of that, or in general, of any other faults: but if he knew the vitiosity, he is 
liable, if it were not shown to the buyer, or of itself evident or unknown, in which 
case the seller is not obliged, if he do not expressly paction; as if the seller 
commending his ware, say that a servant is beautiful, or a horse well contrived, he 
is not liable to make it good; but if he say the servant is learned, or skilful in any 
art, he must make it good.65 
Thus in cases of latent faults, Stair contemplates that a seller who does not know of the fault is 
liable to restore the buyer to the status quo by giving back the price and annulling the bargain 
(discussed below). On the other hand, where the seller innocently affirms that the fault does 
not exist at the time of the sale, the seller is liable to “make good the damage” rather than for 
“making up the buyer’s interest”. The reference to the actio quanti minoris would suggest that 
the “buyer’s interest” was in the price of the goods, which should therefore be abated 
according to the effects of the fault they were suffering from. On the other hand, “make good 
the damage” suggests that the seller was obliged to restore the buyer’s loss more generally. 
                                                
64 Mommsen, Krueger and Watson (trs), The Digest of Justinian, 4 vols (Philadelphia, 1985), vol 2, 520. 
65 Stair, Inst., i.14.1. 
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There is little suggestion of a distinction between what would now be understood as 
contractual damages, available to make up the expectation interest of the buyer, and delictual 
damages, which are available to restore the buyer to the status quo. For Stair, liability for 
affirming goods to be sound is likely to have been an obligation of reparation for a wrong, and 
is thus in the realm of delict. This seems to have been the approach taken in Aitoun v Fairy 
(1699) 66, which treated a claim for an express ‘upholding’ as subject to the same limitations as 
an action for latent insufficiency.  
Liability in reparation 
As mentioned above, the seller of faulty goods could also, under Stair, be liable in delict. 
Firstly, under the heading of ‘Reparation’, Stair says that, “circumvention signifieth the act of 
fraud whereby a person is induced to a deed or obligation by deceit, and is called dolus malus, 
in opposition to dolus bonus, or solertia” 67 . Modern Scots law considers intentional 
misrepresentation, and within that category active concealment, to be fraud. There is no doubt 
that Stair would also have regarded it as such. However, Reid has shown that Stair’s 
conception of fraud was very wide indeed, and there seems likely that Stair would have also 
considered the sale of goods under the private knowledge that they were faulty to be an 
instance of fraud68. Thus liability in delict did not always require deceitful intent. A merely 
negligent seller could find himself liable under the brocard culpa lata dolo aequiparatur. The 
difference, Stair observes, is that whereas “dolus est magis animi, and oftentimes by positive 
acts, lata culpa is rather facti, and by omission of that which the party is obliged to show”69. 
Stein suggests that this linkage of the notion of culpa lata with dolus was used as means for 
the courts to infer fraud from circumstances. He further argues that the courts (at all events 
                                                
66 (1669) M 14230. 
67 Stair, Inst., i.9.9. 
68 Reid and MacQueen, ‘Fraud or Error: A Thought Experiment?’ (2013) 17 Edinburgh Law Review 343; Reid, 
‘Fraud in Scots Law’ (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2012), 66ff. 
69 Stair, Inst., i.9.11. 
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prior to the landmark English case of Derry v Peek (1889)70, which was then accepted as the 
position in Scots law) used the culpa lata principle in cases of non-fraudulent 
misrepresentation. Thus if a representation had been made (including non-disclosure or 
concealment) where it appeared that insufficient care had been taken as to its accuracy, the 
court was capable of labelling the conduct fraudulent, and giving the buyer a remedy. In other 
words, the maxim culpa lata dolo aequiparatur allowed the courts to provide a remedy where 
the conduct of the contracting parties was not purposefully deceitful, but nonetheless appeared 
to have been without reasonable care. 
As discussed above, Stein suggests that the Byzantines considered liability under the aediles’ 
edict to be an example of liability for culpa, rather than the imposition of objective liability. It 
is thus perhaps unsurprising to find the same approach present in Stair’s treatment71, and so 
liability for latent insufficiency is given as an example of a lata culpa72. Stair then goes on to 
describe the liability of the seller under the aediles’ edict: 
The Romans had also their actio redhibitoria et quanti minoris whereby the deceived 
might obtain what damages they had sustained by the fraud, or might thereby annul the 
bargain. And where the lesion was very great, fraud was presumed, as when the price 
exceeded the double value of the ware. But they did not consider small differences 
betwixt the ware and price, which would have raised multitudes of debates hurtful to 
trade… As when merchants set out their ware, or though they should falsely assert it 
cost them so much, or that the ware was fashionable or good, there was no civil remeid, 
unless the damage were considerable. In which sense only it is true, in commercio licit 
                                                
70 (1889) LR 14 App Cas 337. 
71 Cf. Evans-Jones, ‘Actio Quanti Minoris’. 
72 Although Stein’s assessment is assumed to be accurate, or at least a statement the challenge of which is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, it is nonetheless noted that the only reference to the expression lata culpa in the books of 
the Digest dealing with sale is in relation to the sale of an inheritance (D.18.4.2.5). Here, the seller will be liable 
for his lata culpa should he find himself in possession of an accessory to the inheritance sold but fails to make it 
over to the buyer. This is hardly a rule about latent defects. Stair’s assertion that latent insufficiency if not 
disclosed was deceit probably came not from the Romans, but from the canonists, and in particular Saint 
Ambrose, whom Stair cited in the first edition but not the later editions. See Reid, ‘Fraud in Scots Law’, 50; 
Wilson, ‘sources and Method of the Institutions of the Law of Scotland by Sir James Dalrymple, 1st Viscount 
Stair, with Specific Reference to the Law of Obligations’ (PhD, University of Edinburgh, 2011).  
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decipere; because though it be not simply lawful, yet it is against no civil law. But the 
sophistication of ware, or concealing the insufficiency thereof, was held fraudulent, 
and reparable actione redhibitoria aut quanti minoris.73 
The “sentiments of the civil law” were, Stair continues, “generally followed by our custom”74. 
In other words, knowing sale of defective goods, although without active concealment, 
nonetheless produced liability equivalent to fraud.  
Given that liability for latent insufficiency was not strict, but was based on an objective 
standard (culpa), it ought to follow (and Stair also notes) that if the seller was ignorant of the 
defect without negligence, then there was no liability75. However, in a later passage under the 
title ‘Discussing of Ordinary Actions, till the Final Sentence’ which deals with exceptions, 
Stair says that,  
If it be latent insufficiency, it will rather be esteemed that [the buyer] was dolo 
circumscriptus than error lapsus; for it will rather be presumed, that the seller knew 
the fault and concealed it, than that the other was ignorant of it.76 
Early case law shows that this presumption applied in cases where a fault appeared very soon 
after the sale (see below). Coupled with the requirement that the defect be sufficiently serious 
as to “impede use of the thing bought”77, it would been very difficult for the seller to 
overcome the presumption, provided the buyer was not himself negligent78. Thus Stein argues 
that liability for latent insufficiency was a species of presumed fraud79.  
The remedies for latent insufficiency are, as discussed above, redhibition, to restore the price 
and annul the contract, or quanti minoris, in order to make up the buyer’s status quo interest, 
                                                
73 Stair, Inst., i.9.10. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Stair, Inst., i.10.14. 
76 Stair, Inst., iv.40.24; Stein, Fault, 175. 
77 Stair, Inst., i.10.14. 
78 See Evans-Jones, ‘Actio Quanti Minoris’, at 195. 
79 Stein, Fault, 172–173. See also Reid, ‘The Doctrine of Presumptive Fraud in Scots Law’ (2013) 34(3) JLH 307. 
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which are thus treated as examples of presumptive fraud in a contractual setting. Where the 
seller had made an express statement about the fault, or knew about it and did not disclose to 
the buyer, the seller is liable to “make good” the buyer’s interest, thus the former has been 
treated as an aspect of contractual liability and the latter as an aspect of reparation for fraud. 
Finally, as for the availability of remedies, the most obvious change from Roman law in 
Stair’s treatment of latent insufficiency is that Stair would require the seller to offer back the 
thing sold before permitting him to seek an abatement of the price quanti minoris. It is not 
clear from the text whether this was Stair’s understanding of the effect of the civil law, or 
whether there was some other reason for it. 
Error in substantia 
In Stair’s treatment of the law the non-negligent buyer of faulty goods might be able to escape 
the contract and recover the price if his consent was affected by error in the substantials, 
because “[t]hese who err in the substantials of what is done, contract not”80. As has already 
been discussed in the context of fraud, Stair addresses the possibility of latent insufficiency as 
something that might give rise to a plea in error, and concludes (as stated above) that it would 
“rather be esteemed that the buyer was dolo circumventus, than errore lapsus”81. Crucially, 
though, the pleas of error and of fraud are distinct82.  
Stair’s use of the phrase “in substantials” is notable as he thereby adopted ius commune 
terminology83, but he does not expand further. The impact of the ius commune and Aristotlean 
metaphysics on Stair’s conception of error is a complex and continuing subject of debate, 
much of which is irrelevant to this thesis. Here the view is taken that Stair’s conception of 
error had principally in mind (in the present context) those cases where the fault rendered the 
subject a completely different kind of thing from that contemplated, not merely a faulty 
                                                
80 Stair, Inst., i.10.13. 
81 Stair, Inst., iv.40.24. 
82 Reid and MacQueen, ‘Fraud or Error: A Thought Experiment?’, at 359. 
83 MacLeod, ‘Before Bell’, at 397–8. 
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version of it. MacLeod, considering whether Stair’s approach to error has its roots in 
scholastic-natural law traditions or in the ius commune tradition, argues that Stair’s conception 
of error is rooted “firmly” in the latter84. As for the understanding of error by the ius commune 
writers, MacLeod argues that, 
According to Ulpian, error in substantia is relevant because it affects the essence 
or ousia of the object. The latter term was central to Aristotle’s metaphysics and 
theory of categories. There, it was used to denote those characteristics which 
define an object’s identity so that object x is no longer object x if one of its 
essential characteristics is changed. Classical Roman lawyers may not have 
understood the text in this way, but Aristotle so dominated later medieval thought 
that it is very likely that ius commune writers did.85 
Thus error in substantia is treated as an extension of error in corpore, where the accidents of 
the object have as much significance in determining the object to which the parties direct their 
wills as the identity of the object itself – or rather, that the accidents of the object are 
intrinsically tied up with the identity of the object itself. Under Stair, it might therefore 
initially be thought that a buyer of faulty goods could be considered to have acted in error 
because the fault it suffers renders it a substantially different thing to the thing that he had 
intended to buy, but really the complaint is not the fault affecting the thing but the fact that it 
is not the same kind of item. This sophisticated explanation is fundamentally different to the 
more pragmatic approach under ius civile. It may be concluded that error, under Stair, is not a 
relevant category of liability for the sale of faulty goods. 
In summary, liability of an ignorant seller under Stair could be imposed under three heads. 
Firstly, the seller might be liable in contract for having affirmed to the buyer that the goods 
possessed a certain quality on the basis of the express or implied terms of the bargain. 
However, in the absence of any express statements, liability for latent insufficiency is the 
domain of delict. In such cases, the seller was obliged to “make good the damage” occasioned 
by the fault. 
                                                
84 Ibid, at 389. 
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Secondly, the seller might be held liable in delict because of his culpa in failing to disclose a 
latent fault. In this case, the requirement that the fault “impede the use of the thing”, together 
with the presumption that the fault existed at the time of the sale, meant that Stair did 
contemplate the liability of an innocent, non-negligent seller, if only based on his inability to 
prove the state of his knowledge. The buyer’s remedy was limited to reversal of the bargain or 
an abatement of the price according to the value of the loss.  
Finally, and also in delict, but at the other end of the spectrum, there was liability based on 
dolus where the seller knew of the fault, and, rather than simply failing to disclose it, he 
concealed its existence – or of course where he intentionally gave the buyer incorrect 
information in order to complete the sale. 
It is noted that prima facie the seller of faulty goods might have been liable to take them back 
and annul the bargain if the buyer had made an error in the substantials of the contract by 
consenting to buy something essentially different to the subject the seller consented to sell. 
However, the complaint in such cases is not the fault of the item, but that the thing is not 
actually what it professes to be. Furthermore, although this plea was available for unilateral 
error, it depended on the state of the buyer’s mind, and it is thus difficult to see how such a 
plea would have been successful under normal circumstances. 
CASE LAW 
It is perhaps not surprising – given that Stair himself delivered the judgments in some cases, 
and that copies of his manuscript but as-yet unpublished Institutions had been in circulation 
since the early 1660s86 – that the case law from this period generally accords with the 
treatment provided by Stair. Unfortunately, however, there are no cases of sale of faulty goods 
found in Morison’s Dictionary that are discussed in terms of error or intentional deceit, and 
cases pled on the presumption of non-disclosure arising from latent insufficiency alone are 
rarely successful. Instead, cases where the buyer is successful are pled on the basis of the 
seller having ‘affirmed’ the existence or non-existence of a particular quality of the goods. 
                                                
86 Watson, ‘Book Review: The Institutions of the Law of Scotland (1693) by James Viscount Stair, David M 
Walker (ed)’ (1983) 27 American Journal of Legal History 214 at 215. 
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Where either plea might be relevant, there is a general tendency of the pleaders to prefer to 
rely on the seller’s affirmation of the goods, which is often described in terms of the seller 
having ‘upheld’ the goods as sound, rather than on a presumption of non-disclosure of the 
fault.  
Latent insufficiency 
Although lawyers were reasonably familiar with the Roman texts on latent insufficiency, and 
the courts appear to accept the relevancy of the actio redhibitoria and actio quanti minoris, 
“there is no question of a simple application of these remedies in Scots law”87 – and 
furthermore their availability and effect seem to have been varyingly understood. For example, 
while Stair makes no such distinction, in Seaton v Charmichael & Findlay (1680)88 it was 
suggested in argumentation that the actio redhibitoria was available before acceptance, and 
the actio quanti minoris for an abatement of price if the goods had been accepted but turned 
out insufficient. In Fairie v Inglis (1669)89 a connection was made between the actio quanti 
minoris as a remedy for defect with the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for laesio enormis90.  
Stair also suggested that the law of Scotland was generally the same in cases of sale of faulty 
goods as the civil law91. However, case law suggests that the time after the sale in which the 
seller might be held liable was drastically reduced in Scots practice compared to the Roman 
law. Several late-17th century cases deal with liability arising from the insufficiency of goods 
in the absence of any evidence of statements or intentional deceit on the part of the seller and 
show that if complained of sufficiently soon after the sale, insufficiency operated as a 
                                                
87 Gordon, ‘Sale’ in Zimmermann and Reid (eds), A History of Private Law in Scotland, 2 vols (Oxford, 2000), 
vol 2, 309. 
88 (1680) Mor 14234. 
89 (1669) Mor 14231. 
90 For further discussion of the effect this had on the recognition of the actio quanti minoris in Scots law, see 
Evans-Jones, ‘Actio Quanti Minoris’. 
91 Stair, Inst., i.14.1. 
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presumption in favour of existence of the fault at the time of the sale, which ought to have 
been disclosed, and thus were treated as the equivalent of a fraud on the buyer. In these cases 
it is not necessary to prove the seller’s knowledge of the fault, and there is support for Stair’s 
assertion that there was a presumption against error. However, the evidential presumption that 
the fault existed – at the time of the sale is not applied lightly where the buyer seeks to return 
the goods after any lapse of time. 
Brisbane v Merchants in Glasgow (1684)92 shows that liability for latent insufficiency was 
only available a short time after the sale. Here, the seller was not bound to take back 
insufficient victual because time had elapsed so that it might have deteriorated merely by 
being kept so long.  
In Morison v Forrester (1712)93, the submissions of counsel for the purchaser show that 
pleaders were familiar with – and were willing to directly cite – the Roman texts dealing with 
latent insufficiency without further authority. In this case, the purchaser bought a horse that 
had certain defects that were discovered about 2 or 3 weeks later. The seller had not made any 
express communication concerning these faults, and we are given no information on whether 
the seller actually knew of the defect. Nonetheless, the purchaser contended that selling 
defective goods was fraudulent whether knowledge was proved or not, and that it could be 
remedied through the “actio redhibitoria ex edicto aedilitio”. He summarized the law in this 
way: 
[…T]he principle of all laws banish fraud and deceits from all bargains, but mainly 
from emption vendition, which is contractus optimae fidei; and the Roman law has 
provided three remedies in such cases; the first is actio ex empto ad praestandum 
dolum, […] where the machinations of sellers to circumvene ignorant buyers are 
prevented; and Ulpian says, If the seller knows the defects of the thing sold and 
conceals them, he underlies this action; but he will be so much more liable, if, 
when interrogated, he affirm the beast to be sound. The second is the actio 
redhibitoria ex edicto aedilitio, whereby parties buying faulty wares, and induced 
by the seller’s silence, would not have bought them if the faults had been open and 
discovered to them, in that case they must take back the thing and restore the price 
                                                
92 (1684) M 14235, 12328, Fountainhall i.316. See also Mitchell v Bissett (1694) M 14236, Fountainhall i.163. 
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in interest and damages. The third, is actio quanti minoris, to refund me in so far 
as it was less worth than truly was paid for it. 
The case of insufficiency, and of having affirmed that the goods to be free of fault, are clearly 
identified by counsel as both being part of a system of rules that are for the prevention of 
frauds. The case was ultimately dismissed, again because the buyer had complained of the 
fault too late – although it again appeared that if the buyer had made an express statement as to 
the fault that the decision would have been in the buyer’s favour. 
The actio quanti minoris seems to have been contemplated in Baird v Charteris (1686)94, 
which concerned the sale of wheat. The purchaser sought a deduction from the sale price of 
the sale because “some was blacked and spoiled”, and the court allowed the purchaser to prove 
his case.  
Express upholding 
As discussed above, the action for redhibition was available only a short time after the sale, 
even in cases where the seller had upheld (or, in Stair’s language, affirmed) the quality of the 
goods. In Aitoun v Fairy (1669)95, the seller had “upheld” a horse as being six years old, when 
in fact the horse was twelve. Although this fact was not readily available to the buyer, and 
could therefore be considered latent, the court would not sanction a claim for repetition unless 
the buyer proved that “very shortly after the purchase, he had offered back the horse”. 
On the other hand, where the claim was in damages, the fact that the buyer had upheld the 
goods as sufficient was relevant. In Watson v Stewart (1694)96, a claim on the basis of rotten 
tobacco seeking redhibition or quanti minoris was refused due to the fact that the goods had 
been disposed of. However, the court specifically reserved to the buyer an action for damages 
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on the same basis, wherein it was “thought relevant to prove, by his oath, that he sold by 
samples which were disconform; or that he knew the insufficiency”97.   
Where there was no ‘express upholding’, and the goods were not generally insufficient for 
normal purposes, the courts did not give the buyer any remedy. Seaton v Carmichael (1680)98 
concerned the sale of a low-quality form of barley. That the case appears in Stair’s Decisions 
is evidence enough that Stair himself was the judge99. The purchaser was a malter. When he 
attempted to process the barley, it would not malt. His primary claim was that the 
insufficiency of the barley for malting afforded him a right of redress because the seller had 
‘upheld’ the barley as “good, sufficient and marketable”. He claimed that the law gave redress 
in cases of latent insufficiency in the absence of any express statement, and thus logically that 
there must be stronger grounds for finding the seller liable when there was, in fact, an express 
statement.  
The problem was that the purchaser could not really argue that the barley was faulty per se. 
Rather the barley was sufficient, just not for malting. The case therefore depended on whether 
the term “good, sufficient and marketable” comprised sufficiency for malting. If it did, then 
the seller would, provided he was held to his statement, be found liable. On the other hand, if, 
as the seller argued, the description given was did no more than import the general liability for 
latent insufficiency – i.e. did not require that the barley be fit for malting – then the seller 
would not be found liable. It will be noted that had the purchaser’s case been successful, it 
would have been at odds with the account given in Stair’s Institutions, above. He was in effect 
asking the courts to hold an ignorant seller to a higher standard of sufficiency taking into 
account the buyer’s purpose in buying the goods, which must have been known to the seller.  
                                                
97 Emphasis added. 
98 (1680) M 14234, Stair ii.749. 
99 Wilson, ‘Sources and Method of the Institutions of the Law of Scotland’, 158. 
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The Lords refused to allow it. They concluded that the barley was marketable as meal, but not 
for malting, and that there was no reason to hold the barley as insufficient, but added that this 
was only “unless an express communication was made to the contrary”100.  
More generally, a claim on the basis of the seller’s statement could be refused on other 
grounds. In Pearson v Taylor (1699)101, it was refused because the purchaser had not followed 
the statutory means of proof, where a seller sued on a bond that bore to be granted for “good 
and sufficient well-packed herring”. The relevance of the purchaser’s case does not seem to 
have been disputed. 
In Wightman v Saundry (1694)102, the court again indicated that it was willing to find the seller 
liable for an “express upholding” of the quality of the goods being sold, but refused to do – in 
this case because the seller’s statements only amounted to sales “puff”. Here, the parties 
agreed for the sale and purchase of sheep wool. The seller stated that the purchaser could 
achieve a certain number of pounds of “fined” wool out of every stone of wool. The figure 
actually obtained after processing was significantly less. Like Seaton, this defect cannot 
properly be considered insufficiency according to the laws of the time – the wool presumably 
being of marketable quality in and of itself. Ultimately, the Lords would not allow an 
abatement of the price because the seller’s statements were “verba jactantia” and not an 
“express upholding”. 
SUMMARY 
Liability for sales of faulty goods in early Scots law was about the fraud or presumed fraud of 
the seller in misleading the buyer. The most obvious case of fraud was where the seller 
‘upheld’ the goods as having a particular quality, or being fit for a particular purpose. 
However, even latent insufficiency enough to hinder the use of the thing, if not disclosed, was 
deceit – and though not fraud per se, was still culpa lata, the equivalent of fraud. Early Scots 
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law shows that the existence of the fault, and thus consequently a presumption of fraud, arose 
where a latent defect was discovered shortly after the sale, on the basis that the seller must 
have known of a defect so serious as to affect the use of the thing. There is reason to conclude 
that error was not a relevant category in terms of liability for goods that proved to be faulty, 
yet met their description. 
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CHAPTER 3: WARRANDICE I 
Bankton’s Institute103 and Erskine’s Institution104 can be taken to “give the law as it was 
understood [by them] in the middle of the eighteenth century”105. By the time of publication of 
both works (1751 and 1773 respectively), it had long been the practice to describe the seller’s 
obligation to protect the buyer of heritable property from eviction as an “implied 
warrandice”106. However, only the earlier of the two (Bankton) extended the terminology of 
warrandice to liability for selling faulty goods. Bankton regarded the liability under the 
warrandice for sale of defective goods as being liability for deceit, but it seems that Erskine 
did not, and he does not mention it as a type of fraud. Case law, too, shows a great deal of 
friction between two conceptual bases for holding the seller of faulty goods liable: on one 
view it was a form of objective liability, arising ex lege from a wrong against the buyer, and 
on the other, it was subjective, arising from the implicit terms and from the nature of the 
contract.  
BANKTON 
Bankton’s work follows Stair’s Institutes fairly closely, although he appears to be more 
conscious of the differences between English and Scottish law, and is careful to refer to the 
authority of Roman law where they differ. Bankton observes that the price paid for the goods 
has some relationship with the quality that could be expected where the parties have not 
agreed, but he does not link this to the seller’s liability for sale of faulty goods. As stated 
above, Bankton employed the terminology of warrandice or warranty to the sale of faulty 
goods, but as will be discussed, he still regarded these rules to be part of the law of fraud. 
                                                
103 Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of Scotland in Civil Rights (Publications of the Stair Society, 41-43, 
Edinburgh, 1751, reprinted 1993). 
104 Erskine, An Institute of the Law of Scotland, 1st ed (Edinburgh, 1771, reprinted 2014). 
105 Stein, Fault, 177. 
106 See below, page 34ff. 
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Dealing with fraud, under the heading of ‘Reparation arising from Crimes or Delinquencies’, 
Bankton notes that, “in all cases where Deceit is the cause of the obligation, or incident, 
concerning any substantial part of it, the person lesed may insist either or have the deed 
reduced, or his damages repaired”107. The meaning of “substantial part of it” is unclear108. 
Unlike Stair, he does not mention latent insufficiency in his discussion of fraud, and instead 
considerably elaborates on the frauds committed by a bankrupt person. 
Bankton also makes reference to aedilitian liability, under the title dealing with ‘Obligations 
Conventional’, in the context of a series of rules that “generally hold” in the “interpretation of 
writings” 109. Here, he says that: 
Where the quality of any thing is not exprest, it is understood to be neither of the 
best, nor the worst of the kind, but of the middle sort; as if so much grain is due or 
contracted for, and in sale, where the price is not determined, it is understood the 
ordinary price of such things at the time and place of the contract; but where the 
value of things, not delivered, becomes due, it is regulated by the rate of such 
things at the time and place covenanted for the delivery.110 
Bankton thus connects the price for the thing with the quality expected of it, albeit he is only 
here describing the case where the parties have not agreed on the matter. It is noted here – 
because it seems to have been introduced into the law at some later stage – that there is no 
suggestion that the price paid for a thing should be taken as a relevant factor in the 
determination of the quality that could be expected by a buyer. 
Later, dealing with ‘Permutation and Sale’, Bankton discusses liability for defects more fully. 
He states that, 
[L]atent insufficiency, if it hinder the use of the thing, makes way to annulling the 
bargain by an action, termed in the civil law Actio redhibitoria: but if the 
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insufficiency only render the thing less valuable, there was only place for the 
action Quanti minoris, whereby the buyer might have an abatement of the price, or, 
in permutation, a reasonable compensation: but whenever the insufficiency 
appears, the thing must be offered back, or protestation taken, because retention 
will import homologation and acquiescence: if the receiver knew the insufficiency 
of the thing, or ought to have known it, as being self-evident, he has no remedy. If 
the seller or exchanger knew the faults or insufficiency of the thing delivered to 
him, whereof the receiver was ignorant, the deliverer is liable in all damages 
sustained therethrough: thus, one, that knowingly sells, or give in exchange, cattle 
labouring under any infection disease, must repair to the receiver the whole loss he 
sustains thro' the spreading of the disease among his own cattle.111 
This is essentially a repetition of Stair, or perhaps the civil law; the only innovation on Stair is 
the distinction between major faults, which give rise to redhibition, and minor faults, which 
only allow the quanti minoris. The distinction, Stein argues, is based on an interpretation of 
the civil law112, although why Bankton introduced the distinction when it was not evident in 
Stair is unclear. 
In the next paragraph, Bankton takes the view that the actio rehibitoria and quanti minoris 
“were founded in the nature of the thing”, and contrasts their availability with liability for 
fraud which rather ought to be remediable “in every case”113. The meaning of the phrase “in 
the nature of the thing” is not clear. Stein (although not explicit about exactly what he was 
referring to) might have taken it to mean that, for Bankton, liability for latent insufficiency “no 
longer seems to be regarded as a case of presumed fraud”114. Evans-Jones concludes that the 
phrase was a reference to the naturalia of the sale, in the manner of Erskine (see below), and 
thus that Bankton regarded the actions “as part of the contract of sale itself” 115. However, 
Bankton uses the phrase “nature of the thing” frequently throughout his Institute, and it rather 
seems that this was his way of communicating to the reader that the statement was founded in 
                                                
111 Bankton, Inst., i.19.2. 
112 Stein, Fault, 177. 
113 Bankton, Inst., i.19.2. 
114 Stein, Fault, 178. 
115 Evans-Jones, ‘Actio Quanti Minoris’, at 199. 
   
  
33 
natural law, as opposed to being a rule adopted from the civil law, present in the common law 
or custom, or promulgated by statute116. Thus it is suggested that the reference to the “nature 
of the thing” in the context of the availability of the action for latent insufficiency means 
simply that the buyer has a right of redress from principles of equity alone, regardless of law, 
and that “every case” means all cases of contract, not limited to sale. If this is correct, then 
Bankton was not making any doctrinal claim about the basis of the remedy. 
Bankton describes instances of latent insufficiency as an aspect of implied warrandice. In a 
passage dealing with the comparison Scots law to the law of England on the topic of contracts, 
he says,  
By our law, in sale of goods and lands, where no warrandice is exprest, absolute 
warrandice is implied, viz. […T]hat they labour under not latent insufficiency; for, 
as to such as are obvious to one’s senses, his Eye is his merchant, according to our 
vulgar proverb […]117  
For the reasons stated above, it cannot be safely concluded that the reference to warrandice 
meant that Bankton did not regard the action for breach of such warrandice as an action in 
fraud.  
On the other hand, there is clear evidence that Bankton regarded liability for false statements 
(‘warrantee’ as opposed to ‘warrandice’118) made at the time of the contract (“parcel of the 
bargain”) as being founded in “deceit”. In the passage immediately after the one dealing with 
implied warrandice, he says, 
                                                
116 The phrase “nature of the thing” is used 72 times in total across all four Books. The conclusion that Bankton is 
referring to natural law when he uses this phrase is tentatively drawn from an absence of a common technical 
meaning across all the topics where it is used, combined with the frequency of times the phrase is contrasted with 
another source of law: e.g., statute (i.21.13), common law (i.10.153). 
117 Bankton, Inst., i.19.8. 
118 Cf. Gow, who in 1963 suggested that the concept of ‘warranty’ is comprehended within the wider concept of 
‘warrandice’, Gow, ‘Warrandice in Sale of Goods’ (1963) JR 31 at 33. 
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Where warrantee is granted upon sale of goods, it must be parcel of the bargain; 
for, if it be after, (at another place) it is a void warrantee, and no action of deceit 
lies, tho’ the case should be otherwise than in the terms of the warrantee.119 
(Underline added) 
Finally, as with Stair, error is not given a particularly detailed discussion, but seems at least 
capable of applying to sales of faulty goods. The force of contract “arises from the will of the 
parties”120. Thus, “[e]rror, in the Substantials of a contract, will no doubt vitiate it, but not, if 
only in the Circumstantials of no great moment, but which will be rectified in execution upon 
the contract”121. 
ERSKINE 
As Stein notes, Bankton and Erskine appear to be “agree as to the general effect of fraud in 
Scotland they are not ad idem as to the effect of latent insufficiency in the thing sold”122. Their 
dissensus could have been a simple difference of opinion, but it is possible, especially given 
the sudden developments in case law noted below, that when Erskine was writing the law had 
in fact progressed significantly in the decades between his text and that of Bankton. Erskine 
considers that the seller’s liability for selling faulty goods arises from the naturalia of the sale, 
which suggests that the buyer’s claim finds its basis “in the contract of sale itself”123. Equally, 
however, Erskine does not describe the seller’s liability in terms of warrandice or warranty, 
which is unusual given that it was described as such in Bankton’s work, and in case law pre-
dating Erskine’s Institute on several occasions (see below).  
Under the heading ‘Of Obligations and Contracts in General, etc’, Erskine notes that both 
error and fraud affect consent necessary to contract. Error is dealt with first, where he says that, 
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[…C]onsent, which is necessary to every contract, is excluded, first, by error in the 
essentials of it; for those who err cannot be said to agree. This obtains, whether the 
error regards the person of the other contracting party […] or the subject-matter of 
the contract – as if one contracting to sell a piece of gold-plate should deliver to 
the purchaser one of brass. But if the error lies only in the accidental qualities of 
the subject, the contract is valid – e.g. if the gold has a greater mixture of alloy 
than it ought to have had.124 
Erskine does not go any further than to cite the Digest and the examples from it, however the 
Aristotlean influence, which was noted to be the subject of debate when discussing Stair’s 
treatment, is more obvious in the above passage, which refers both to the “essentials” of the 
contract, and to the “accidental qualities” of the subject of the contract. In giving the example 
of adulterated gold he does seem to exclude the possibility that error might comprehend cases 
of sale of faulty goods by categorising them as ‘accidental’ qualities. 
Next, dealing with fraud, Erskine makes his well-known statement: 
Fraud or dole is defined a machination or contrivance to deceive; and where it 
appears that the party would not have entered into the contract had he not been 
fraudulently let into it, or, as it is expressed in the Roman law, ubi dolus dedit 
causam contractui, he is justly said not to have contracted, but to be deceived.125 
Finally, Erskine discusses liability for sale of faulty goods is under the heading ‘Of 
Obligations Arising from Consent, etc’. Here, in contrast with Stair and Bankton, the 
obligation of the seller to deliver goods free from fault is expressly considered as part of the 
naturalia of the contract of sale. Erskine discusses the Roman law and then Scots practice, 
concluding that the action on latent insufficiency is, 
[…B]y our usage, limited to the special case where the buyer, in a few days after 
the goods have been delivered to him, offers them back to the seller; for otherwise 
it is presumed, from the buyer’s silence, either that he that passed from all 
objections to the sale, or that the insufficiency has happened after the goods came 
to his possession.126 
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It would appear that in cases where the buyer gets the whole subject for which he contracted, 
Erskine would not allow the actio quanti minoris. He reasons that, “as no action is, by our 
usage, competent for setting aside sales on account of the disproportion of the price to the 
value of the commodity, it may well be doubted whether the buyer would, in consideration of 
its insufficiency, be entitled to the abatement of any part of the price”127. This does seem to go 
further than Stair, who as discussed above would have instead limited the availability of the 
actio quanti minoris to cases where the buyer had offered to give back the thing to the seller, 
but the phrase “it is doubtful” perhaps requires some emphasis: Erskine is not making any 
strong claim that Scots law does not recognise the actio quanti minoris, and is instead positing 
a logical argument. Gordon suggests that Erskine’s argument “evidently is that defective 
goods which are still usable are simply worth less than the price agreed and the general 
principle of Scots law is that the buyer has no remedy in any case where he has paid more than 
the thing was worth”128.  
CASE LAW 
Implied warrandice 
The development of the terminology seems to have happened at some point during the mid-
18th century, possibly in 1761 with the decision in Ralston v Robertson (discussed below)129, 
which caused the seller’s liability for sale of faulty goods to become known as implied 
warrandice. It is somewhat of a mystery when or why this change occurred, and even more 
puzzling why it was omitted by Erskine from his treatment of the obligations on the seller of 
goods. Evans-Jones considers that, “the language of ‘implied warrandice’ is significant since 
the basis of the cause of action is clearly identified”130. 
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Furthermore, up until this point, it had not been decided whether proof of non-negligent 
ignorance would absolve the seller of liability – that is, whether showing a lack of knowledge 
of the fault under circumstances where that knowledge could not be expected was a sufficient 
defence131. Neither Bankton’s Institute nor Erskine’s Institutes, consider the point, but it can 
be taken from Stair’s treatment, based on a presumption of culpa, that it would. In this sense, 
Ralston v Robertson (1761)132 represents a significant change in the law, because it suggests 
that even an excusable lack of knowledge does not prevent redress. In this case the purchaser’s 
agent bought a horse that was immediately delivered. The agent claimed that he had “hardly 
gone 30 yards when the he discovered the horse was racked or slipt in the back, and had a 
blemish in one eye”. He immediately insisted that the seller should take it back, but the seller 
refused to accept it. The seller’s argument was that he had no knowledge of the defect, having 
only had it in his possession for a very short time after he had bought it, during which he had 
not even had the time to inspect it. 
The Sheriff dismissed the purchaser’s action: the horse was not “upheld”133 to be sound, and 
the faults were not purposefully hidden or concealed. On appeal, the purchaser suggested that 
if the seller knew the fault and concealed it he had acted fraudulently – but that the purchaser 
was equally entitled to be free of the contract regardless of knowledge. He argued that, 
whether the seller knew of the defect or not, “it was implied into the very nature of every 
bargain of this kind, that the thing bound is to be free of faults […] which render the thing sold 
altogether useless, and which no man would have purchased if he had known of the faults 
attending it”134. This was founded on the “implied warrandice in contract”. 
                                                
131 Perhaps this was because it is difficult to imagine a defect as serious as to affect use of the thing that the buyer 
was not aware of. Evans-Jones suggests that, “since it was a condition of the actions redhibitoria and quanti 
minoris that the defect ‘impede use of the thing,’ we may assume that the seller was at least deemed to have 
known of such defects”: Ibid, at 194. 
132 (1761) M 14238. 
133 Meaning “vouched for” or “guaranteed (a state of affairs)”: see Dictionary of Scots Language 
(http://www.dsl.ac.uk/), s.v. “uphald”. 
134 Ralston v Robertson (1761) M 14238. 
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The seller responded with an argument disclosing his unfamiliarity with the terminology being 
used in the case. He argued that, if he had upheld the horse, he would be liable ex contractu. If 
he had wilfully deceived or imposed upon the pursuer, he would have been liable ex delicto. 
However, having proved that he did not know of the faults, and having declined to “uphold” 
the horse as sound, he could not be held liable. The seller described the purchaser’s claim as 
being based on an “imaginary implied warrandice”, which seems to ignore the long line of 
authority that held sellers liable without the need to prove intentional deceit. It does perhaps, 
however, suggest that the purchaser’s claim, couched as it was in terms of an ‘implied 
warrandice’, was a novel characterisation of the law. 
The court, reversing the decision of the Sheriff, was of the opinion that, “when a man sells a 
horse for full value, there is an implied warrandice, both of soundness and title, nor is there 
any necessity to prove the knowledge of the seller”135. The defender was found liable for the 
price. The content of the report, if we assume it is an accurate representation of the actual ratio, 
is not novel. However, while the report says there is no need to prove knowledge, the outcome 
of the decision would suggest that knowledge simply was not a relevant consideration for this 
form of liability. If this is accurate, then Ralston is an important development, and could be 
understood as a shift from a test of negligence to a test that did not focus on presumed 
knowledge or culpa lata, connected with an implication of soundness arising from sale at a 
market value.  
It is not obvious from earlier case law the extent to which patent defects were considered 
insufficiency. It is clear, though, that – at least by the late-18th century – even relatively 
obvious defects were afforded a remedy if the buyer was not aware of them. There are cases 
showing that where the purchaser has received faulty goods without the concealment (or 
presumed concealment) a remedy is still available. In Lindsay v Wilson (1771)136, a case 
similar in facts to Ralston v Robertson137, the Lord Ordinary found that two horses sold to 
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Wilson were lame at the time of sale. However, he also considered that, “this was such a 
defect as might have been observed by any person who viewed them with ordinary attention”. 
The Lord Ordinary found that the horses had in fact been inspected, both before and at the 
time of sale, and in respect that the purchaser had not proved (1) that the horses had been 
upheld as sound, or (2) that the seller had afterwards agreed to take them back. As a result, the 
seller was not bound to take them back. The Court reversed the Lord Ordinary’s interlocutor. 
Despite the obviousness of the defect, the report states that the seller was liable as the result of 
an “implied obligation”:  
It is an implied obligation on the vender, in all sales, omne vitium abesse, 
particularly as to horses.138 
Later cases indicate that the approach in Ralston was not an anomaly, and the language of 
implied warrandice was being deployed consistently from 1791 onwards. In Martin v Ewart 
(1791)139, the purchaser inspected and took delivery of a horse, which turned out to be 
defective. The seller argued that the price “could not be called a sound price”, and that the 
purchaser “took notice” of a blemish in the horse’s eye before the sale was completed. 
Evidence showed that the blemish was not more serious than might have been surmised from a 
visual inspection. The Lord Ordinary did not consider the extent of the defect relevant, and 
found for the purchaser. Only Lord Eskgrove is noted to have “doubted whether there was any 
warrandice in the case of so patent a defect”. In Durie v Oswald (1791)140, the seller of a horse 
“upheld” it as sound apart from burn on the horse’s leg, which the seller told the purchaser 
was of “no consequence”. The horse was “immediately” discovered lame, and the seller was 
found liable. In Brown v Laurie (1791)141, the seller acknowledged the horse to be very old, 
and sold him for a “low price”. It seems that the horse was of lower quality than even the low 
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price would suggest, because, “yet the horse being found very useless the seller was found 
liable upon the implied warrandice”. 
By the close of the 18th century, there is evidence that at least some of the lower courts 
continued to have difficulty with the effect of the suggestion that the seller did not know of the 
defect and whether it amounted to a defence, but the Inner House was unequivocal: proof of 
knowledge was not only unnecessary, it was irrelevant. In Ewart v Hamilton (1791)142, the 
purchaser of a horse found after the sale that the horse was lame, and brought an action for 
repetition of the price. The Lord Ordinary found that there was no evidence the horse was 
lame while in the seller’s possession, but found some evidence of lameness beforehand. He 
also found in fact that the seller was not aware of this earlier lameness. The Lord Ordinary 
held that, 
[…T]he defender is not accountable […] for the lameness which the horse had 
before he bought him, but of which there is no evidence that he knew any thing.143 
On a reclaiming petition with answers, the Court found Hamilton liable for repetition 
regardless of his knowledge of the defect. Again we see the suggestion that this liability is 
imported from payment of a sound price. The report states that,  
The Court thought it was clearly proved that the lameness was of an old date, and 
that, having taken a sound price from Ewart, Hamilton was liable in warrandice 
even though he did not know the animal’s condition.144 
Fitness for purpose 
No reported cases in the late-17th and early-18th century held the seller liable in cases where 
the goods were generally sufficient in their own kind in the absence of express upholding or 
fraud. Another innovation, or perhaps clarification, thus occurred in the mid-18th century 
where the seller is held liable for the sale of goods which did not meet the buyer’s stated 
                                                
142 (1791) Hume 667. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
   
  
41 
requirements, even if the seller did not expressly uphold them as suitable, if the purpose was 
overt and it was implicit from the price paid that a higher standard of sufficiency should be 
met. In Baird v Pagan (1765)145, the seller was found liable for a failure to meet the standard 
of quality expected by the buyer. It will be recalled that this complaint was not considered 
relevant as one of latent insufficiency.146 Baird was a case about the sale of ale for export to 
the West Indies. It appears that the ale was not properly prepared for the hot climate. The 
purchaser claimed that a “considerably” higher price was paid for ale suitable for this purpose, 
indicating that there had been some discussion about the buyer’s motives. The Lords held that 
as the ale was bought for export, it must meet that claim. It might however be noted that the 
decision does not directly conflict with Seaton v Carmichael147, based on the reported facts, as 
there is no evidence that anything had passed between the parties about the buyer’s purpose or 
that a higher price was paid in that case. 
While the price was relevant in cases where the seller did not make any express statements 
about the thing, it was clearly not relevant in cases where he did. In Brown v Gilbert (1791)148, 
an unsound horse was sold at auction to highest bidder. The seller argued that, because in an 
auction he ran the risk of the price that may be offered, the buyer ought also to accept the risk 
of the quality of the article. This argument was rejected because the seller had previously 
advertised that he was selling the horse not because the horse was faulty, but merely because 
he was leaving the country and had no need for him. This statement was not repeated at the 
auction. Were it not for this previous statement it is doubtful whether the seller would have 
been held liable, which suggests that the previous statement was essential to liability. There is 
no suggestion of intentional deceit.  In Russell v Ferrier & Ainslie (1792)149, the Lord 
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Ordinary (Henderland), although speaking obiter, found it relevant that a “false account” had 
been given of a visible defect. 
Intentional deceit 
During this period there seems to have been a great deal of confusion about the scope of 
aedilician liability. In Smith v Steel (1768)150 the seller of a faulty horse was described as a 
“cheat” and found liable in fraud for the sale of a horse where he had made some statements to 
the buyer without care as to their accuracy, or perhaps not believing them to be true. The case 
is interesting because it is one of few on this subject during the relevant time period where the 
actual words of the judges can be found151. 
In Smith, the purchaser of the horse offered to give it back in return for the price after a period 
of two or three months claiming that he had been “imposed on” because the horse was 
unsound. At the time of the sale, the seller explained that the horse had been injured in an 
accident, but that he considered the horse to be perfectly recovered “according to his own best 
judgment and that of a skilful farrier”. Although a farrier had certified the horse as recovered, 
there was evidence to the effect that the seller did not believe his own statement and suspected 
that the horse was not well. The horse was “immediately” discovered to be suffering from a 
defect, but was put to use for a further period of 4 weeks before the purchaser complained. 
The purchaser explained that this was done so from uncertainty as to the cause of the defect, 
and not from mora on his part. 
The seller thought that his liability in such circumstances would be ex edicto aedilicae, and 
thus due to the lapse of time he could not be obliged to take the horse back. He argued, 
The principle upon which the actio redhibitoria of the Roman law, which we have 
adopted with some limitations, proceeds, is the equitable intention of hindering a 
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seller from profiting by a fraudulent concealment of the defects of the thing sold, 
and a buyer from being hurt by his ignorance of these defects: and therefore it is, 
that if the buyer cannot plead ignorance of the defects of the thing sold, at the time 
of making the bargain, or if after the thing sold is in his possession he discovers its 
imperfection, and does not then offer it back but retains it, and uses it as his own, 
for a considerable time, he is barred from insisting in an action of restitution.152 
The court’s discussion focused on the effect of the delay between identification of the defect 
and the complaint, but there is some discussion of the basis for the seller’s liability. Lord 
Pitfour’s reasons reflect the decision of the majority. Any evidence of fraud is enough to allow 
the purchaser to return the horse where his right to do so might otherwise have elapsed. 
Clear in law fraud must be restrained. But as clear tis ag[ains]t commerce. Where 
no fraud I will not allow to return after long time. This a Principle of great 
importance – Here tho I own I'm apt to suspect fraud – Had it been a Country 
Gentleman I should not have feared.153 
The Lord President alludes to a distinction between sales of horses and sales of victual, 
because in the former the ability to ascertain the fault is “[not] so certain”. Unfortunately these 
comments are not elaborated upon. Lord Kames describes the seller’s liability in terms of 
warrandice, which is regarded as liability for fraud.154 
In Adamson v Smith (1799)155, in which there was proof of fraudulent concealment. In 
Adamson, the seller told the buyer that rye-grass seed was perennial, rather than annual. There 
was proof (by the seller’s own admission) that he was altogether uncertain which kind of seed 
he in fact possessed. The court inferred that he was also aware that perennial seed was able to 
command a much higher price, and the buyer had told him that he was looking specifically for 
perennial seed. The report of the case shows that the debate focused on the seller’s bad faith 
and concealment of his uncertainty, rather than the deficient nature of the goods (they were not 
strictly deficient) or the fact that the seller made a misstatement about the goods. The same 
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can be said of Birnie v Weir (1800)156, in which the seller of potashes suggested they could be 
used for a particular purpose while concealing information from a professor of natural science 
which said they would be unsuitable for that purpose. The sellers maintained that they were in 
bona fides, but the court disagreed and found them liable. There is no suggestion that the 
potashes were properly speaking “defective”, and the entire claim is predicated on knowing 
concealment by giving false information. 
SUMMARY 
The late-18th century shows some developments in the law, and in particular the idea that 
liability for sale of faulty goods might arise from the contract in the form of an implied 
guarantee of quality. However, these developments were not immediate and universal: there is 
still a great deal of evidence that liability lay in fraud despite being described as a warrandice, 
which from the perspective of modern Scots law does not make much sense. The suggestion 
made by this thesis is that the law of the late-18th century was in a state of flux between two 
fundamentally different doctrinal bases for the liability of the seller of faulty goods, which was 
not resolved until the start of the next century. 
                                                
156 (1800) 4 Pat 144. The report of this case is unsatisfactory. The Session Papers disclose that a significant 
amount of the discussion was about whether or not the seller knew of the fault and concealed it, while the report 
distorts the case to suggest that the buyers were successful merely because the potashes did not match their 
description. 
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CHAPTER 4: WARRANDICE II  
In the early-19th century, there is trace suggestion that liability for sale of faulty goods arises in 
the fraud or fraud-equivalent of the seller, and instead the idea that the terms and conditions of 
the bargain between the parties imply that the goods ought to be of satisfactory quality is the 
dominant way of thinking. The objective liability of the early law had thus given way to a 
standard attributed to the parties’ agreement itself. Additionally, the legal texts that can be 
taken to provide the law as it was in the 19th century deal with the subject of the seller of 
faulty goods in considerably more detail than texts covering the earlier periods. 
HUME 
Hume’s treatment (taken from manuscripts and students' notes of his lectures given 1821-2 
and published in 1939) can be taken to represent the law of the early 19th century. In his 
Lectures157, he discusses the subject of sale of faulty goods in much more detail than Bankton 
and Erskine did. Considerable departures from the law of the 18th century can be identified. 
Although the nature of the material must be taken into consideration – in this case, an 
extensive series of lectures rather than a concise textbook – error appears to be given a far 
more prominent role than in what has gone before. Furthermore, although no express 
connection is made, there are strong similarities between the justification for holding the seller 
of faulty goods liable in warrandice to the justification for allowing an erring party to escape 
the contract. 
Hume regarded contract as the “by far the most ample and important source” of private 
obligations158. He does not give any general treatment of contract, but he does note that the 
most important type of contract was the contract of sale, and provides a substantial treatment 
on this type of contract in particular. 
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Hume deals firstly with error. Here, he says that “[s]ome errors are so substantial as to take 
away all pretence of a binding contract” 159. He provides the following examples of “error as to 
the article sold”: 
The parties, I suppose, bargain on a piece of plate, both of them believing it to be 
silver, but it proves to be a plated article, or of some base or adulterated metal. Or 
the parties bargain on a box of jewels, thinking that they are genuine diamonds and 
rubies, whereas they are mere paste and composition. Certainly the buyer is not 
bound to take this base or false article at any, even the lowest price. Though he get 
the individual stipulated corpus, yet he does not get the sort of commodity or 
description of subject which alone he meant to buy.160 
The examples given are the same as given by Erskine, taken from the Digest. Both are no 
doubt of the quality of the goods sold, as there is no suggestion in either case that the buyer 
has mistaken one object for another. However, error again depends on the buyer’s ability to 
place them in a category or description which is different from what he intended to buy, and 
might thus be thought not applicable to merely faulty goods. 
Hume does seem to consider that unilateral error is a relevant plea. Discussing error as to the 
existence of the subject sold, he contemplates the possibility of liability arising from the 
concealment of the seller. In the manuscript of his original notes, Hume considers that Duthie 
v Carnegy161 – a case where one party concealed that a ship had suffered an accident, and 
which was subsequently wrecked – might, even in the absence of knowing concealment, be 
good grounds for a case of essential error. However, his students' notes put it slightly 
differently: 
Where there is reason to apprehend that any such accident has happened the seller 
should make the other party acquainted with the full extent of his information on 
the subject, and if this be not done either by laying before him his correspondence 
with regard to it or in some other equally full and satisfactory manner the 
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purchaser will be relieved if he appear to have been mislead even unintentionally 
by the seller.162 
This passage, although in a section discussing the effect of error in the substantials of the 
contract, rests the liability of the seller not on the buyer’s error, but on having misled the buyer, 
albeit unintentionally. Later, Hume says, 
In what I have said on this subject, you will always, however, understand me to 
speak of errors of a casual and excusable nature, such as are owing to inadvertency, 
miscalculation, or the like, and not of those which involve some gross fault on the 
part of the seller, still less of those which are attended with any degree of mala 
fides. […] These are cases of deception not of accidental or excusable error, and 
are not to be governed by the same rule.163 
The reference to gross fault is presumably a direct translation to English of the phrase lata 
culpa, and thus Hume puts error caused by the negligence of the seller in misleading the buyer 
as a category of fraud. 
Dealing next with fraud in general, Hume states that the seller may keep circumstantial 
intelligence to himself, and that it is for the buyer to make his own investigations, the principle 
being caveat emptor. Thus simply not providing information relevant to the buyer is not fraud, 
but there is a significant caveat in that the circumstances concealed must be “such as the 
purchaser might know, and as to which he has no occasion to rely on the seller”164. This would 
of course exclude latent defects from the things that the seller might keep to himself without 
incurring liability. Further, Hume is very clear that silence in this context has a very limited 
meaning. He says, 
The law goes, however, no farther in favour of anyone, than to let him keep his 
intelligence to himself. If he go one step further, and tell a falsehood, or make a 
deceitful answer to any enquiry on the other party, and if this falsehood be such as 
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has an influence on the terms of the bargain, this the law considers as a wrong – a 
fraud – of which the party can have no advantage.165  
Thus Hume does not give as examples of fraud any cases of faults affecting goods, yet it is 
clear that his description of fraud would be extend to the sale of goods in the knowledge of 
their latent defects. In summary, the seller who knows of a latent fault and does not disclose it, 
or who conceals a patent fault, is liable as part of the law of fraud. The seller who negligently 
misleads the buyer on an essential matter is also probably liable – perhaps to a lesser extent – 
in terms of fraud, rather than error. An excusably ignorant seller is liable as a result of the 
buyer’s error, rather than fraud.  
Lastly, for Hume, the seller can be held liable in contract for the sale of faulty goods as a 
breach of a “material obligation”166. Liability in this way is described in terms of a warrandice, 
which comprises two things: a guarantee against eviction; and “[t]hat the commodity shall be 
fit and serviceable for the uses whereto it hath been sold”167. The examples given are rotten 
cloth, unwholesome wine, and unsound horses. Hume observes that this obligation “is the true 
nature and bona fides of the bargain of parties, that the subject is bought and sold to a certain 
use and employment, which if it does not answer, the seller has not implemented his part of 
the contract, and must take back his commodity”168. The obligation is, however, not limited to 
the ordinary use of the goods: 
[T]he buyer hath still the like warrandice, if it is not apt for the particular use to 
which he bought it, provided always that at buying he explicitly declared this use, 
and thus warned the seller of the footing on which the contract was to be. For if he 
does so, and the seller, understanding his object, furnishes the thing, and takes a 
corresponding price for it, then certainly he is as much bound to warrant it in that 
particular, though he have not in words undertaken an express obligation to that 
purpose, as he is bound in the ordinary case to warrant against ordinary faults.169 
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If dolus is a “kind of opposite number” to bona fides170, then liability under the warrandice 
seems, for Hume, to be a rule preventing frauds, but not part of the law of fraud. The pronoun 
“his” combined with the potential for multiple meanings of the word “object” in the phrase 
“understanding his object” could plausibly be a reference to the expectation that the seller is 
aware of the features and faults of the goods he intends to sell. Alternately, it could refer to the 
intended use for which the buyer is buying the goods. The latter is perhaps more likely, given 
Hume’s later discussion (in reference to the above passage) of the differences between earlier 
law, which he thought only held the seller liable where he had made “an express upholding”, 
and the later law in which “the practice has since completely altered”171.  
For Hume, liability under the warrandice, like liability for concealment of better intelligence, 
only extends to “such faults only as were latent and unknown to the buyer”172. However, we 
are then told: 
The rule does not apply so strictly to those cases where the thing is bought much 
under the known and selling price of a sound commodity of that sort at the time, as 
if one buy wool, or flax, or meal, or the like, in a public market, much under the 
market price of the day. […] But I do not mean to say that the buyer has to run the 
risk of all vices, and to pay for a subject which is absolutely useless.173  
Hume does not give any explanation of the logic behind this statement, but continues that a 
“like distinction” might be made where the seller expressly informs the buyer “that he will not 
warrant the commodity, and that he must judge for himself and take it as it stands”174. It might 
                                                
170 See Zimmermann, Obligations, 665; Reid, ‘Fraud in Scots Law’, 48–50. 
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be reasoned therefore that the variation in standards applicable to goods being sold at lower 
than market price occurs because the buyer is in effect put on his guard as to the existence of 
latent faults. 
As for the remedies which are available for breach of the warrandice, Hume refers back to the 
Digest text dealing with the aediles’ edict and explains the effect thus: 
[T]he operation is that the buyer may return the subject on the seller, and is not 
obliged to keep it even at any lower and abated price; because it is not the sort of 
subject which he meant to buy.175 
It is notable that the same justification is given here as explanation of the availability of the 
remedies for implied warrandice as is given for the effect of essential error (see above). He 
continues, 
The return of the thing upon [the seller] is not to be viewed as a penalty inflicted 
as for an offence, but as a natural attribute of the contract, flowing from the 
implied condition of their bargain.176 
Hume’s understanding of aedilitian liability is that it is not a rule about fraud, but, taken 
together with his discussion of the role of culpa lata in error, the above passage would suggest 
that he recognised the aediles’ regulatory role in the prevention of frauds. Thus he similarly 
would not impart blame on the ignorant seller of faulty goods, but would nonetheless allow the 
buyer a remedy. The innovation on Stair and the Roman law is that the obligation to do so 
arises not ex lege but from the contract itself. 
Hume would also allow restorative damages where “the buyer, necessarily and immediately, 
must suffer damage from [the] bad quality in the attempt to make use of [the goods]”, even if 
the seller acted ignorantly177. His authority is Dickson v Kincaid (1808)178. In a case where the 
                                                
175 Ibid, 43. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 15 Dec 1808, FC. 
   
  
51 
seller knew of the fault and “industriously” concealed it, “the notion of what is to be 
considered as damage shall be very much extended so as to include a reparation even of all the 
more remote and consequential mischief that ensues”179. 
Lastly, Hume discusses the availability of the actio quanti minoris, which he considers was in 
Roman law a remedy afforded to the buyer where the thing was not “worth the price that [had] 
been taken for it” or was not a “fair and equal bargain”180. He concludes that this remedy is 
not available in Scots law, and refers back to the “opinion of one even of the Roman lawyers – 
and one of the most eminent of them, Pomponius, for the proposition that, “[i]n pretio 
cemptionis venditionis, naturaliter licet contrahentibus se circumvenire”181. Given the general 
lack of direct reference to the Digest elsewhere, its inclusion here is noticeable. It might be 
questioned why Hume felt it necessary to refer to back to Roman texts at all, not least a 
fragment of the Digest dealing with the protection of minors. The answer might be that the 
weight of Scots authority appeared to be against him, with a number of cases seemingly 
confirming the existence in Scots law of what was being described as an actio quanti minoris. 
The excerpt from the Digest allowed Hume sufficient justification to argue that although these 
cases, although appearing to give the actio quanti minoris, must in fact have been applying “a 
different principle”182. The difference, argued Hume, was that they were cases where the buyer 
did not get the full extent of what he had contracted for. Hume’s difficulties appear to have 
sprung from conflation of the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for laesio enormis, which he 
did not regard as part of Scots law, and as a remedy for edictal faults. Hume does not deal 
directly with the latter, but Evans-Jones concludes on the basis of an interpretation of the 
phrase “not obliged to keep it even at a lower and abated price” (quoted above) that Hume 
would not have rejected that remedy183. 
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Mungo Ponton Brown’s Treatise on the Law of Sale (1821) was published around the same 
time Hume was delivering his Lectures, and also deals with the seller’s liability for sale of 
faulty goods. Although they are from the same year, Hume and Brown are clearly not ad idem 
on a number of important matters. Furthermore, while Hume’s purpose was to set out the 
principles of law to his students, Brown’s work had a different focus. Unlike Bankton, who 
simply aimed to set out the laws of Scotland and show in which ways the law of England 
differed, Brown was pointedly concerned with the influence of English jurisprudence on Scots 
law.184  
Secondly, Brown’s Treatise is much more of an attempt to state what the law was, according 
to the sources and case law, than what the law ought to be. Brown would have been in the 
process of compiling his Synopsis at the time he was writing his Treatise, and he seems to 
place a significant emphasis on setting out and organising the case law where possible, rather 
than rationalising the principles. 
This approach is evident in Brown’s treatment of error, which is largely a survey of the 
Roman and English sources. However, he does note that there seems to be “confusion among 
the works of the commentators”185 as to the doctrine, which,  
[A]rises not only from the different reading of the [Roman] texts noticed by 
Bynkershoek, and from the doubts which have been raised as to the doctrines 
which may be inferred from them, but also from the circumstances that different 
writers among the modern civilians make use of different terms in speaking of the 
same thing. Thus some of them, in considering what is called in the text of the 
Corpus Juris, error in substantia, or error in materia, call it an error in the 
essential qualities of the thing sold, while others treat of error in materia and error 
in quality, as specifically distinct.186 
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This potential for conflation of ideas is not particularly relevant for the time being, but – as 
will be discussed below187 – Bell is criticised by Stein for what is effectively the same 
confusion, and thus the fact that it is alluded to by Brown in 1821 is worth noting here. 
Brown’s discussion of the seller’s liability for sale of faulty goods – which is described as a 
warrandice against faults – is discussed together with the warrandice against eviction under 
the general topic of obligations incumbent on the vendor ‘from the nature of the contract’. 
Brown begins by arguing that, “the law of Scotland in regard to this […] obligation of 
warrandice, is different, in certain important particulars, both from the Roman law and the law 
of England”188. He thus endeavours to identify how it differs “in short and general terms”. He 
continues, 
In the law of Scotland, a remedy similar to that afforded by the actio redhibitoria, 
is competent to the vendee, although there has been no express warranty; and in 
this respect, our law agreed with the Roman, and differs from the law of England. 
But we have rejected the actio quanti minoris, as being inconsistent with the true 
principles of the contract, and hurtful to trade.189 
This passage seems to be referring to the actio quanti minoris as a remedy for laesio enormis, 
although he makes no explicit reference to any distinction in usage of the phrase based on 
context.  
Brown then notes that not every fault will give rise to a competent action for redhibition. He 
states that, “the fault itself […] must be of such a nature as to render the thing sold unfit for 
the vendee’s purpose”190. This confirms the hypothesis above that the mid-18th century saw an 
expansion in the type of faults that might give the buyer a claim from the types contemplated 
by Stair – something Brown seems to have overlooked with his later reference to the case of 
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Seaton v Carmichael191. Stair’s argument that the fault must render the object unfit for its 
“proper purpose” is interpreted by Brown as meaning that the fault complained of must not be 
“of a slight and partial kind”192. 
As with the other writers, patent faults are excluded from the “obligation of warrandice”. 
Moreover, where the fault is patent or obvious, Brown considers that not even an express 
warranty will allow the buyer a claim. He notes first that such a claim is not actionable in 
English law, and then cites Stair for the proposition that Scots would “in like manner” refuse 
it193. He adds, though, citing Duthie v Carnegie (1815)194, that, 
[…I]f, at the time of the sale, the subject is in such a situation that the purchaser 
cannot examine it with a view to discover[ing] faults, e.g. a ship at sea, it will 
amount to a fraud on the part of the seller, if he shall conceal any material defect 
which he actually knew of, and the contract will be liable to reduction on this 
ground.195 
In early Scots law the courts were certainly inclined to presume the existence of a fault in the 
goods where the buyer offered them back very soon after the sale. Brown seems to think that 
this practice has altered, although he does not explicitly address the presumption. Although he 
cites only one Scots case, which does not expressly deal with point, Brown refers to English 
law which, in one case, held in an action on a warranty of a horse that “it is not enough for the 
vendee to show that the vice may have existed at the date of the sale – he must establish the 
fact beyond all doubt […] So in our law […]”196. This highlighted phrase would suggest that 
Brown thought Scots and English rules were the same on this issue. 
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Brown’s thorough review of the case law and diligent approach are visible in his assessment 
of the time after the sale in which the buyer’s action on the warrandice is competent. Brown 
considers that Erskine may have stated the law incorrectly in stating that the actio 
redhibitioria was only available in Scots law “a few days after the goods have been delivered 
to him”, and wonders “whether the time when the defect of the subject is discovered by the 
vendee is not to be regarded, as well as the time of delivery”197. He derives this position from 
case law ranging from 1629 to 1808, accurately noting that they do not agree on a precise 
formulation, but possibly ignoring the fact that the law might have changed over time. 
Another case in which the seller is not liable in Roman and English law is, according to Brown, 
where the seller has excluded the warranty, for example by declaring the thing is sold ‘with all 
faults’. In such cases, the seller is not liable unless he actively conceals the fault, which is 
fraud198. 
As to the availability of damages, Brown follows the now ordinary distinction between the 
ignorant seller, who is liable in repetition of the price only, and the seller who knows of the 
fault, who is liable for “the whole loss the vendee has sustained”199. However, Brown 
innovates that, where the seller acts “in the exercise of his trade”, even the ignorant seller will 
be liable for any loss arising from the “proper use” of the article by the buyer200. The 
justification given, for which Brown refers to Pothier, is that the “tradesman, by offering 
himself to the public as a person of skill in a particular trade, spondet peritiam artis, renders 
himself responsible to those who employ him for the sufficiency of the commodity in which 
he deals”201. On the basis of this justification, Brown considers that “the liability of the vendor 
is carried further than these principles would warrant”202 in the case of Dickson v Kincaid 
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(1808)203, which held that the seller of seed was liable in consequential damages despite his 
ignorance as to the defect and despite the fact the defect could not be identified by persons of 
reasonable skill in his trade. 
Finally, under the chapter dealing with the warrandice against faults, Brown suggests that 
where the buyer made an “express written warranty […] certifying” the quality of the goods 
the seller was “guilty of a misrepresentation” should the matter stated turn out to be otherwise. 
However, where the matter complained of was not within the bounds of the warranty, the 
misrepresentation was of no effect204.  
BELL 
First published in 1829, Bell’s Principles is the last of the classic institutional authorities. The 
fourth edition of 1839 – the last authored by Bell himself – can be taken to be Bell’s final 
statement on the law, and gives the law as it was in 1839. Bell locates his discussion of the 
effect of error and fraud under the title ‘Of Conventional Obligations’, and then discusses 
particular aspects of the ‘sale of Goods and Merchandise’ later. Bell does seem to go further 
than Hume in connecting error in the substantials with liability for the sale of faulty goods, 
however Stein believes that Bell did not actually include the latter as a category of essential 
error. 
Under the heading ‘Nature and Requisites of Consent’, Bell describes the effect of error thus: 
Error in substantials, where in fact or in law, invalidates consent, where reliance is 
placed on the thing mistaken.205  
For this proposition, he cites Stair, Erskine, the Digest and Pothier’s Traite des Obligations, 
but Stein suggests that Bell was likely to have followed Pothier206. Bell states: 
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Error in substantials, whether in fact or in law, invalidates consent, where reliance 
is placed on the thing mistaken. Such error in substantials may be, 1. in relation to 
the subject of the contract or obligation, as when one commodity is mistaken for 
another; […or] 4. in relation to the quality of the thing engaged for, if expressly or 
tacitly essential to the bargain […]207 
These two of the five categories might be understood to equate to error in corpore and error 
in substantia or materia respectively, and thus that they are on all fours with what are 
described as the ‘classic’ categories of error in substantials. The former takes into account an 
error where a party mistakes one thing for another thing; the latter where the thing is correctly 
identified, but is substantially different from what the party understood it to be.  
Stein makes two important assertions about certain aspects of Bell’s conception of error. 
Firstly, he suggests that Bell was influenced by Pothier’s treatment, but that Bell introduced a 
“curious change in Pothier’s formulation”208 of essential error. By including the example of 
one commodity being mistaken for another under the heading of error as to the subject, Bell’s 
text was confusing. As stated above, in classical Roman law error in corpore included the 
situation where the parties had not directed their minds to the same object. Error in substantia, 
or error in materia, referred to situations where the qualities an object possessed were so tied 
up in the identity of the object, that absence of them rendered the object’s identity an 
altogether different thing, such that the parties were again not ad idem. In the former, one 
party may have intended to buy the Sempronian estate, the other to sell the Cornelian estate209. 
In the latter, vinegar may have been sold as wine210. According to Stein, Bell had included 
both cases under the heading of error as to the subject matter, but nonetheless continued to 
refer to error in quality separately.  
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Stein therefore suggests that either (a) the anomalous description of essential error was an 
instance of Bell being “misled by Erskine”211, or (b) that Bell had intentionally conflated error 
in substantia and error in corpore212. With reference to the cases cited by Bell in support of the 
category of error as to quality, Stein asserts that the latter is more likely213. It followed that 
Bell must have meant error as to quality was something different altogether from error in 
substantia214.  
Secondly, Stein notes that all the cases Bell cited in support of his category of error as to 
quality were also cited as “examples of the implied condition in sale” that the thing should 
correspond with its description or sample215. He therefore concludes that,  
When [Bell] spoke of error in quality ‘expressly or tacitly essential to the bargain,’ 
[he] was thinking of cases of failure to supply goods of the description contracted 
for, i.e. where it was a condition of the contract, express or implied, that the goods 
should be of a certain type.216 
Thus Stein suggests that Bell’s “error in quality” really had nothing to do with the “quality” of 
the goods, or the seller’s liability for the sale of faulty goods, and was rather about the 
conformity of the goods with the description of the goods as it would have been understood by 
the parties. 
Dealing with the conditions in sale, Bell provides: 
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It is a condition implied, that the goods shall be fit for the purpose for which they 
bought, and such as they are represented or taken to be, according to the fair 
understanding of the parties.217 
With the understanding of error discussed above, only the latter part of this condition is 
comprehended in error. Latent faults and faults that the buyer had no opportunity to inspect are 
not error in the substantials, but are still part of the “conditions in sale”, and Bell says they are 
exceptions to the general rule of caveat emptor218. Unlike Hume, Bell uses the terminology of 
‘warranty’ rather than ‘warrandice’, which he reserves for the guarantee against eviction in 
sales of heritable property219. 
CASE LAW 
With one potentially anomalous exception (discussed immediately below), there are no 
significant developments in the case law of the first half of the 19th century: the law is 
gradually refined and some minor points are clarified220.  
Implied warrandice 
One case in particular is difficult to reconcile with the frameworks provided by all three of the 
writers discussed above. Dickson v Kincaid (1808)221 was Hume’s authority for the position 
the innocent seller of faulty goods could be held liable for any immediate and natural damages 
caused in the use of the faulty goods, but Brown argued that the case was doubtful. Here the 
court awarded damages to the buyer of a “spurious or bastard kind” of turnip seed even though 
it was admitted that the seller had no way of knowing that the turnip seed had been adulterated, 
                                                
217 Bell, Prin, s 95. The first edition does not expressly state this to be an implied condition, nor does it prima 
facie limit application of the condition to the sale of goods: Bell, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 1st ed 
(Edinburgh, 1829) s 40. 
218 Bell, Prin, s 97. 
219 Bell, Prin, s 99. 
220 Gordon, ‘Sale’, 323. 
221 15 Dec 1808, FC. 
   
  
60 
and he had not held himself out to be an expert in turnip seed. The court described the seller’s 
liability as being in “implied warrandice” or “express warrandice”. The Lord Ordinary (Hope) 
held that, under the “implied warrandice in a contract of sale, that the thing sold shall be of the 
kind described, and also under the express warrandice of the defender, that this was good 
Swedish seed, the defender is liable to make good to the pursuers the damages occasioned by 
the defect in the seed”. This use of the phrase 'making good' in connection with an action on 
the sale of faulty goods can surely only be a reference to Stair’s treatment222, which contrasted 
redhibitory remedies with remedies in reparation. 
In Ralston v Robb (1808)223, the implied warrandice was applied in a case where the seller 
knew of the fault and concealed it. The court thought that, “under the warrandice of sale, 
whether derived from the payment of the market price of a sound and unblemished horse, or 
from the express stipulation of the parties” the purchaser was entitled to a horse “immediately 
fit for purpose”. They noted that if the disease was so insignificant as to produce no 
inconvenience, “the communication of that fact to the purchaser would not reduce the price on 
the open market” – and thus “the concealment of it must and ought to void the sale”. 
Where the goods were bought by description or by sample, there could be some variation in 
the terminology used. In Whealler v Methuen (1839)224 and Ransan v Mitchell (1845)225, the 
sellers were held to be bound under a contract, without any express warranty as to quality, to 
supply goods of such quality as the price agreed on implied, allowing the buyer to reject 
inferior quality goods and claim repetition of the price. In the former case this liability was 
termed “implied warranty”, in the latter it was described in terms of the goods being “not 
conform to contract”. 
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Muil v Gibb (1840) confirms that the implied warrandice would only apply to defects that 
were more serious than a visual inspection would be able to disclose. Here, the court held that, 
as there was no attempt by the seller to “deceive the purchaser as to the quality at the time the 
bargain was made”, the quality of the goods, being patent to the buyer, was not good grounds 
to object to the sale. On the other hand, where the buyer had no opportunity to inspect the 
goods, the seller was of course obliged to deliver goods of a quality matching the description 
or sample he had given the buyer.226 
Lastly, in Stevenson v Dalrymple (1808)227, the court’s approach shows that the implied 
warrandice is part of the mercantile law, and thus decisions which would produce results that 
might be considered damaging to commerce are rejected. Here, the buyer of faulty goods was 
obliged to pay the price where the goods had been kept for too long after the defect was 
discovered, even though there was evidence that the goods were faulty at the time of the sale.  
Fitness for purpose 
Where the seller made some statement about the goods, the only relevant question as to 
liability, all things being equal, was the extent to which the statement could be relied upon. In 
Birnie v Weir (1800)228, the sellers were held liable in damages for having incorrectly stated 
their potashes to be suitable for bleaching. The case turned on the nature of the sellers’ 
representations, which they contended were not intended to constitute a description of the 
potashes, but were merely for guidance only. The buyer argued that the potashes were bought 
for bleaching, and were not fit for their purpose. The court concluded that the seller was liable 
in damages. 
In Campbell v Mason (1801)229, the seller was obliged to take back a horse which he had 
falsely described as “a quiet, well-tempered horse, fit to be rode by a gentleman advanced in 
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life”. Hume suggests that the outcome would have been the same whether the seller had 
spoken out or not because the buyer “had openly spoken out to [the seller] his purpose to have 
a safe and a quiet horse for the immediate use of an elderly gentleman, and [the seller], even if 
he had not so explicitly given a character of the horse, came in consequence under an implied 
warrandice in that respect”. 
STATUTORY REFORM  
According to the Lord Chancellor’s statement to the House of Lords on 26 February 1856, 
[I]n the latter part of the year 1852, and the beginning of 1853, very great 
complaints were made in the manufacturing districts of England and Scotland, 
particularly at Manchester and Glasgow, that, with regard to a number of matters 
of everyday occurrence to parties engaged in trade, there were a number of 
differences between the laws of the two countries which embarrassed them much, 
and for which there were no adequate reasons.230 
A Royal Charter was therefore established in order to discover which parts of the mercantile 
laws of Scotland, England and Ireland could be usefully homogenised. One area identified was 
the rules on the liability of the seller of faulty goods in contract231. The general opinion seems 
to have been held that neither Scottish law nor English law, which did not provide the buyer 
with a remedy for faults in the absence of fraud or express warranty, were preferable. Thus, 
believing the English approach to be the more modern and commercially suitable approach for 
an age of great advancements in trade, the Royal Charter recommended that the Scots law be 
altered to be in line with the English law. Thus, Section 5 of the Mercantile Law Amendment 
Scotland Act 1856 (“1856 Act”) was passed through Parliament and received royal assent on 
21 July 1856. 
Section 5 stated that, 
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Where Goods shall, after the passing of this Act, be sold, the Seller, if at the Time 
of the Sale he was without Knowledge that the same were defective or of bad 
Quality, shall not be held to have warranted their Quality or Sufficiency, but the 
Goods, with all Faults, shall be at the Risk of the Purchaser, unless the Seller shall 
have given an express Warranty of the Quality or Sufficiency of such Goods, or 
unless the Goods have been expressly sold for a specified and particular Purpose, 
in which Case the Seller shall be considered, without such Warranty, to warrant 
that the same are fit for such Purpose. 
Thus the implied warrandice of quality in sales of goods was disapplied and the buyer was 
then required to show either that the seller had known of the defect at the time of the sale, 
which was “nothing short of fraud”232, that he had given an express warranty, or that the goods 
were bought for a particular purpose which they did not meet. 
Unsuccessful attempts to claim warrandice 
Despite one anonymous contributor to the Journal of Jurisprudence’s warning that the general 
principles of the law of fraud would require to be dusted off now that the implied warrandice 
had been disapplied233, there are no reported cases brought on the head of fraud arising from 
the sale of faulty goods between 1856 and 1893. Rather, the picture is of various buyers 
struggling to find some exception or claim some interpretation of the new provisions that 
might permit their case. However, various attempts to bring cases on grounds that may 
previously have been competent under the implied warrandice failed as the courts took a blunt 
approach to the interpretation of the new law.  
In Young v Giffen (1858)234, the pursuer brought an action against a horse dealer, for 
repayment of the price of a horse that was alleged to be unsound at the date of the purchase. 
                                                
232 Stewart v Jamieson (1863) 1 M 525 per the Lord Justice-Clerk at 529. It is noted that Lord Cowan (at 529) 
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The defender, referring to Section 5 of the Act, argued that there had been no express warranty 
of soundness given, and thus that he was not liable for repetition of the price. 
The pursuer sought to take the case outside the provisions of the Act by suggesting that the 
word “goods” was not a term known to Scots law, and was instead a term found in American 
and English jurisprudence where it was held not to include animal property. The defender 
responded that it was “not intended by this statute to assimilate the law language of the two 
countries, but to regulate the traffic throughout the kingdom”235.  
The Lord President dismissed the suggestion that there should be anything other than a plain 
reading of the meaning of the word ‘goods’, while putting forward the rather odd suggestion 
that one route open to would-be claimants was to argue that an express warranty could be 
“inferred”. He said, 
The action is laid apparently without reference to the statute at all, but on the 
footing that the horse was unsound at the time of the sale, that a full price was paid 
as for a horse free from vice and unsoundness, which the defender, at the time of 
the sale, represented and warranted the horse in question to be. I think that the 
pursuer must take an issue of express warranty, for if the statute meant that “goods” 
should have the meaning contended for by the pursuer, it is difficult to see how it 
would be possible to give effect to the statute. […] An issue of implied warranty 
will not now do, but it will come out at the trial from what circumstance express 
warranty may be inferred. That may be as open to us as it is in England.236 
Meaning of express warranty and relationship with description 
After the abolition of the implied warrandice implicit from the price paid, the courts found it 
necessary to elaborate on the meaning of express warranty in more detail than was required 
under the old regime. In Rose v Johnstone (1878)237, which concerned the sale of a defective 
horse, the Lord Justice-Clerk contrasted words which constituted a warranty of quality, and 
mere “representations” which did not amount to a warranty. He said, 
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The words “express warranty” are used in the statute to exclude and alter the 
former law, which implied a warranty of quality from a full price. But in dealing 
with the evidence of warranty it must be kept in view, first, that the words must 
amount to an express warranty, as contrasted with representation; or assurances, or 
statements of belief of quality; and secondly, it must be proved to what specific 
element of quality the warranty was intended to apply.238 
The courts were not concerned with the form of words employed. In Robertson v Waugh 
(1874)239 and Mackie v Riddell (1874)240 it was held that it was not enough to amount to an 
express warranty that the buyer should prove that the seller had used the words “warrant”, or 
similar. What was necessary was that the buyer should prove the actual terms of the warranty 
being given. Conversely, it was not necessary to use the word “warrant”, or similar, at all, 
provided that the statements might amount, in fact, to a warranty. In Scott v Steel (1857)241, the 
Lord Justice-Clerk noted that,  
It is quite true [the seller] did not use the words, “I warrant”; but he did make such 
a representation as the purchaser showed was essential in his mind to make him 
buy the horse. There was an assurance given in order to induce him to complete 
the sale; and the representation is all the stronger, that the question put showed that 
the purchase was to be made for Scott’s own use, not for resale […]242 
A number of cases after the 1856 Act came into force permitted the buyer to “reject” faulty 
goods upon discovery of a defect on the basis that the quality was not in accordance with the 
seller’s description of the subjects of sale, without explicitly discussing any express warranty. 
These cases show, as Gow suggests, an attempt to “escape from the pervasive caveat emptor” 
by using the “category of description as [a] vehicle of flight and wherever possible 
[construing] every item in a description as constituting a substantial ingredient in the identity 
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of the subject of sale and, therefore, a warranty”243. Doing so had the effect of “blurring the 
distinction between description as meaning ‘kind’ and as meaning an ‘item of 
identification’”244. 
In McCormick & Co v Rittmeyer (1869)245, an order for hemp of “average quality of the 
season” was held to have imported into the agreement a warranty to that effect, which would 
permit the buyer to reject goods of a “very inferior quality, and not in terms of the contract”. 
In Morson & Co v Burns (1866)246, the suggestion that goods were to be “equal to” those of 
another manufacturer was held to allow the buyer to reject the goods in respect of their 
insufficiency, but not to allow him to retain the goods and claim a deduction in the price.  
Conversely, in Stewart v Jamieson (1863)247, a statement that grain was of “fair average 
quality for that kind of crop 1856” was held by majority to import a warranty that the grain 
should be as such, but that the bad quality of the grain did not in fact breach the warranty. 
Lord Cowan, on the other hand, thought that the statement did not amount to a warranty, being 
merely “descriptive of the kind of seeds sent”248. In Hardie v Austin (1870)249, the words 
“first-class stock” amounted to a representation that the seed should come from a certain 
pedigree, but were not considered to import a warranty of their quality. In Jaffé v Ritchie 
(1860)250, the plain term “flax yarn” was not, because of Section 5 of the 1856 Act, held to 
oblige the seller to deliver goods of a particular quality, provided that the goods tended in 
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implement matched that description. 251  Similarly in Hamilton v Robertson (1878), the 
description of a horse as “entire” was not held to import a warranty of quality, and was instead 
a descriptive term.  
Meaning of fitness for special purpose 
In England, it had been held that where goods had only one common purpose, the fact of the 
buyer having bought the goods at all would indicate that his purpose was to use the goods in 
that manner. Thus the exception under Section 5 could conceivably apply to such goods 
without the necessity of the buyer proving that the purpose he was buying the goods was 
disclosed or that the purpose was special in the sense of being not the common usage. Gloag 
notes that the position of the Scottish courts on this matter was doubtful252. In Hamilton v 
Robertson (1878)253, Lord Shand considered that the exception in Section 5 did not apply in 
such cases: 
The provision of the Act does not create or provide a warranty by the seller that 
the goods shall be suited for the general purpose for which such goods are used, 
but for a specified and particular purpose, when that purpose is expressly stated.254 
However, in the later case of Govan v McKillop (1907)255 (albeit discussing an analogous 
exception under the Sale of Goods Act 1893) suggests that Hamilton may not have been 
correct. In that case, food unfit for humans was supplied to a restaurant. The relevancy of the 
claim on the basis of an implied warranty was upheld. 
SUMMARY 
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During the first half of the 19th century liability was doctrinally associated with the consent of 
the parties, and founded in an implied warranty against defects which were not patent or where 
the buyer had no opportunity to inspect the goods. The Institutional writers recognise liability 
for sale of goods that are not fit for the buyer’s purpose, and also a warranty against ordinary 
faults. In the middle of the 19th century this latter warranty is disapplied by statute. Various 
cases from the mid-19th to the late-19th century are about the precise nature of this restriction 
upon the ordinary case of defective goods, although there are no real surprises in terms of how 
the courts apply the new legislation. Cases on defective goods during this period most often 
turned on the meaning of the words used by the seller in the course of the sale, and sometimes 
do not explicitly mention the existence of an express warranty if it was clear the words have 
become part of the bargain, and there is evidence that the courts stretched the meaning of 
“description” to cover certain types of defect, thus mitigating the harshness of the caveat 
emptor principle. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONTEMPORARY LAW I 
This thesis has so far discussed the historical developments of the seller’s liability for the sale 
of faulty goods. In early Scots law, liability lay in the law of fraud. Where the seller knew of a 
latent defect and failed to disclose it, concealed a patent defect, or knowingly gave false 
information, it was dolus. Where the seller was ignorant of a latent defect that appeared soon 
after the sale, it was considered culpa lata – the equivalent of fraud. The liability of the 
ignorant seller was then recast through a period of doctrinal friction to emerge as a condition 
of the bargain termed warrandice, which could either be express, where the seller made some 
statement about the quality of the goods, or implied from silence in appropriate circumstances. 
Section 5 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Scotland Act 1856 thereafter removed the 
implied warrandice, at least insofar as the ignorant seller was concerned, bringing the law in 
line with England in order to smooth perceived difficulties in cross-border trade. There is no 
indication that error was historically used as a category of liability in the context of the sale of 
faulty goods. 
The next two chapters will discuss the present law of liability for sale of faulty goods, which 
consist of two strands: a statutorily implied obligation, and liability for misrepresentation. 
The first of these strands of liability comes from statute, the Sale of Goods Act 1893. Section 
14 of the 1893 Act re-established a limited form of liability for the sale of faulty goods as an 
implied term of the bargain, although now subject to numerous limitations. It retained the 
seller’s liability for provision of goods suitable for the buyer’s purpose, where this had been 
expressed, as a separate kind of liability, but added some additional elements – for example, 
that the seller must have sold the goods in question by way of his trade. The restriction of the 
‘fitness for purpose’ provisions was mitigated to some extent by the partial re-introduction of a 
general implied warranty of “merchantable” quality, although again only where the seller was 
selling as part of his trade.  
The relevant provisions of the 1893 Act were amended, and ultimately replaced by the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979, which was itself amended several times, but the framework for statutory 
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liability has remained largely the same as originally enacted256. However, through these 
successive amendments, the seller’s liability for sale of faulty goods has exceeded the old 
common law where the seller sells in the course of business, while leaving the caveat emptor 
principle almost wholly intact in private sales. With the advent of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977, which prevented contracting out of the seller’s liability for defective goods in 
consumer cases257, the law as to liability for sale of faulty goods is again about the 
establishment of a more objective form of liability, albeit using the language of implied terms. 
The second strand emerged from the cases of Stewart v Kennedy (1890)258, which held that 
error as to the subject-matter of a contract was only relevant if induced by the other party, and 
Menzies v Menzies (1890)259, which held that a contracting party who provides materially false 
information to the other contracting party, thus inducing an error which caused him to contract, 
will be liable whether or not he knew that the information was false. Together, these cases 
incorporated the doctrine of misrepresentation into the law of error260. The implications of this 
doctrine upon the seller’s liability for the sale of faulty goods will be dealt with in the next 
chapter. 
SALE OF GOODS ACT 1893 
The Sale of Goods Act 1893 (“1893 Act”) was originally intended to be a codification of the 
English law on the sale of goods261; the idea that it should extend to Scots law appeared 
relatively late in its development262. Nonetheless, the seller’s liability would have been 
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familiar to Scots lawyers: either the buyer has bought for some purpose known to the seller, in 
which case the goods must be fit for this purpose, or the goods are bought generally, in which 
case they must meet a sufficient standard of quality. Both cases are regarded as flowing from 
the agreement of the parties. 
Section 14 of the 1893 Act provided that an implied warranty of quality or fitness for purpose 
would exist in two cases. The first is where the buyer makes the purpose for which he requires 
the goods known and relies on the seller’s better information. In such cases, where the seller 
acts in the course of business, he is obliged to provide goods “reasonably fit” for the buyer’s 
purpose263. The provision therefore places an emphasis on the buyer’s reliance on the skill and 
information of the seller. However, it was not for the buyer to prove in most cases that there 
had been reliance on the seller’s information – a “strong presumption” was applied, which 
placed the onus of proof on the seller. It was held that the rule still applied where the seller had 
no way of knowing about the defect. Thus the requirement that the buyer should rely on the 
skill and information of the merchant was rather a requirement that the buyer could not hold 
the seller liable where he relied on the skill and information of another person. In Jacobs v 
Scott & Co (1900)264, it was held that Section 14(1) applied in cases where, “whether you call 
it a warranty, a collateral agreement, or in whatever way you like to describe [a] stipulation 
[had become] part of the contract between [the] parties—that the [goods] should be fit to fulfil 
the special purpose for which [they were] purchased”, however the wording of the statute 
suggests that the buyer need not express the purpose where it was implicit, representing an 
innovation in Scots law265. 
A more significant development in favour of the buyer of faulty goods in Scots law came with 
the second subsection of Section 14, which provided that a seller who trades in a particular 
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type of goods had an obligation to supply those goods at a “merchantable” quality266. This 
condition applied to patent defects, unless the buyer had had a chance to inspect the goods.  
Both sections applied to latent defects, without requiring fault. In Williamson v MacPherson 
(1905)267, the seller of brass condenser tubes for shipbuilding which were found after 4 
months' use to be corroded (through the impressively named process of “rapid electrolytic 
dezincification”) was found liable by the Court of Session, by a majority of two to one, under 
Section 14(1) for failing to provide goods which were fit for the buyer’s express purpose. The 
third judge thought the seller was liable not under Section 14(1), but under Section 14(2), for 
failing to provide goods of merchantable quality. The parties themselves seem to have been 
unimpressed by this result: the buyer did not contest an appeal at House of Lords for reversal 
of the interlocutor on the basis that the defect “could not be attributed to defective materials or 
to improper manufacture, and that the parties were agreed that the question of fact should be 
rightly determined in favour of the [seller]”268. 
SUPPLY OF GOODS (IMPLIED TERMS) ACT 1973 
The 1893 Act was an impressive piece of legislation. In 1962, a committee “to review the 
working of the existing legislation relating to merchandise marks and certification trade marks, 
and to consider and report what changes if any in the law and what other measures, if any, are 
desirable for the further protection of the consuming public”269 reported that they had initially 
found “very little criticism of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, as a sound and fair measure”270.  
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While the Molony Committee Report has been criticized for taking an over-cautious 
approach271, it did highlight two areas of concern: first, the general requirement under Section 
14 that the seller be a dealer of goods of the type sold; and second, the “inaptness” of the 
restriction of Section 14(2) (merchantable quality) to sales of goods by description. In relation 
to the former, the committee recommended that the implied terms as to quality should apply 
whether or not there was a continuing course of trade in a particular type of good, provided 
that the seller was acting in the course of business272. In relation to the latter, they suggested 
that, 
The shop counter across which the customer asks for what he wants has ceased to 
be the prominent feature of retail establishments it once was. The customer is now 
encouraged to make his choice unaided by a sales assistant. A very considerable 
proportion of consumer goods are selected from shelves in self-service stores or 
from open counter or racks in shops that sill maintain some sales staff.273 
Under these circumstances, the committee thought it “questionable” whether such sales were 
“by description”, and noted that if they were not, the customer had “no shred of right in law to 
complain of a defective purchase”. They therefore recommended that the condition as to 
merchantability should apply “in all consumer sales”274, thus expanding the number of cases in 
which the seller could be held liable. 
These recommendations were largely repeated in 1969 by a Report of the Law Commission 
and Scottish Law Commission, albeit with two significant changes. First, the Commissions' 
Report recommended a change in terminology from “by way of trade” to “in the course of 
business”275 – the latter being considered to leave less scope for the seller to escape liability. 
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275 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, ‘Exemption Clauses in Contracts, First Report: 
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Secondly, the Molony Committee Report had argued that a definition was “unmerchantable” 
was unnecessary because the “courts have not had much opportunity to develop a theory of 
what [it] constitutes” in relation to mechanical and electrical goods, but “no doubt […] would 
find it well within their competence to do so” 276 . The Commissions disagreed, and 
recommended that the definition of “unmerchantable” be given a statutory footing. The 
recommended test was,  
Goods of any kind are of merchantable quality within the meaning of this Act if 
they are as fit [sic] for the purpose or purposes for which goods of that kind are 
commonly bought as it is reasonable to expect having regard to their price, any 
description applied to them and all the other circumstances […]277 
The Commissions' recommendations were passed into law as part of the Supply of Goods 
(Implied Terms) Act 1973, Section 3 of which amended Section 14 of the 1893 Act. 
The new statutory criteria applicable to the definition of “unmerchantable” were employed in 
Millars of Falkirk Limited v Turpie (1976)278, a case concerning a car discovered to have a 
slight oil leak from the power-steering box, and a minor complaint about a loose bonnet catch. 
The court on the facts found that the car was not unmerchantable, but noted that, even if it was, 
the Act had not provided guidance on whether any breach of Section 14(2), no matter how 
minor, justified rescission of the contract.  
SALE OF GOODS ACT 1979 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 was effectively an Act for the consolidation of various bits of 
legislation279, and made no substantial changes to the implied terms as to quality: even its 
position as Section 14 was retained. 
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SALE AND SUPPLY OF GOODS ACT 1992 
By 1983, the prospect of improving the law relating to the sale of goods had again been 
considered by the Scottish Law Commission, who again proposed amendments to the implied 
terms as to quality280. These amendments were promulgated into law as the Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act 1992. Three significant proposals for amendments were made, along with a 
number of more minor changes.  
Firstly, the definition of “unmerchantable” was again perceived to be problematic. The 
Commission recommended a more precise list of factors, including freedom from minor 
defects, durability and safety, which together comprised a new test of “acceptable” quality281, 
which was later changed to “satisfactory” quality. These new criteria were applied in Lamarra 
v Capital Bank (2006)282 to hold that, inter alia, a scratch to an ashtray of a brand new Land 
Rover, taken together with other defects, constituted “unsatisfactory quality” under the 
circumstances. 
Secondly, addressing the issue that was left unanswered in Millars of Falkirk v Turpie 
(1976)283, the Commission suggested that there should be a different approach taken where the 
buyer was a consumer from cases where the buyer was a non-consumer. In the former case, 
any breach of the implied terms should be considered material; in the latter, breach of an 
implied term would be material where it was not “so slight that it would be unreasonable to 
reject [the goods]”284.  
Finally, noting the potential for abuse, the Commission suggested that goods should only be 
considered as “accepted” (therefore restricting the right to reject the goods, but the right to 
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claim damages, in relation to goods of unsatisfactory quality) where the buyer had a 
reasonable opportunity to accept them. In cases of consumer sales, this provision was to be 
absolute, allowing no derogation by agreement, and in cases of non-consumer sales it was to 
be subject to the normal provisions of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977285. 
The Commissions' recommendations discussed above were generally enacted in the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994. 
SUMMARY 
The Sale of Goods Acts were – and still are – the primary source of liability for the sale of 
defective goods. The process of legislative development began with the disapplication of the 
implied warrandice except where the seller knew or expressly warranted against faults. It went 
on to re-establish an implied warranty based on English common law, albeit only applying 
where the seller acted by way of his trade. In the late 20th century, the Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act 1992 saw more expansive rights where the buyer was a consumer, while 
maintaining the distinction between a seller who sells in the course of business and purely 
private sales. As a result, consumers who buy from a seller acting in the course of business are 
again protected by a form of objective liability, albeit based on the notion of implied warranty 
rather than culpa lata presumed from immediate discovery of an insufficiency.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONTEMPORARY LAW II 
The second strand of liability for the seller of faulty goods in contemporary law is, as 
mentioned at the start of the last chapter, error induced by misrepresentation: that is, where the 
seller has made some representation to the buyer about the subject-matter of the contract 
which is materially false, inducing essential error and thus allowing the buyer to avoid the 
contract. It has since been recognised that this form of liability was, at least insofar as innocent 
misrepresentations were concerned, an innovation to Scots law. Its conception effectively 
caused the law of misrepresentation to be subsumed within the law of error, which was not 
until these developments relevant in sales of faulty goods for the reasons described above. The 
complex history of the development of liability for unintentional misrepresentation is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but merits further investigation. However, given the preceding analysis, 
its introduction seems to have had little to do with the non-availability of remedies on the basis 
of implied warrandice as a result of the 1856 Act, as some have suggested286. Further, it is 
noted that the doctrine has not been very often argued in the context of the sale of goods. 
Misrepresentations are about the provision of information, while non-disclosure is a failure to 
provide information287. There is generally no question of general liability for the latter in Scots 
law, which demands the existence of a duty to disclose before silence is actionable even where 
the other party knows the true state of affairs288. Instead, in modern Scots law – contrary to the 
obiter statements in Stewart v Jamieson (1863)289, and except to the extent provided for by the 
agreement of the parties, or by statute290 – there is no liability for simply knowing of a defect 
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affecting the goods and failing to disclose it to the buyer291. However, the distinction between 
misrepresentation and non-disclosure is not straightforward. Some instances of non-disclosure 
of faults affecting goods may be actionable as misrepresentation, and under this category this 
thesis suggests that there may be liability in misrepresentation for selling faulty goods where 
their outward appearance can be taken as a communication that the fault does not exist. 
This chapter will set out the law of innocent misrepresentation with particular reference to the 
seller’s liability for sale of faulty goods. There are relatively few cases of misrepresentations 
as to the quality of goods, which perhaps is a result of the success of the statutory regime of 
liability. However, certain cases, where the buyer cannot for whatever reason – for example, 
because of successful exclusion of the implied term292, or where it is unclear that an express 
warranty has been given293 – rely on the contract, the doctrine of misrepresentation appears to 
be relevant and has been used. 
Actionable misrepresentation requires four elements: (1) there must be a misrepresentation, (2) 
made by the seller to the buyer, (3) of a material fact, (4) which induces error in the mind of 
the buyer as results in his agreeing to the contract. Knowledge of the true state of affairs on the 
part of the seller (and equally, the existence of negligence) is not a requirement for actionable 
misrepresentation – at all events since the decision in Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow and Great 
Western Railway Company (1914)294 – but is relevant when considering remedies. 
Misrepresentation 
It was recently stated in an Outer House decision that, “a representation, and therefore a 
misrepresentation, is the communication of information concerning a thing or a state of 
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affairs”295, but information can be communicated in any number of ways. In the context of 
faulty goods, the relevant types of misrepresentation are: firstly, and most commonly, the 
words of the seller; and, secondly, the appearance of the goods. 
Statements or words 
A representation can be in the nature of words, spoken or written, which are communicated by 
one contracting party to another before an agreement. The provision of inaccurate information 
through words or writing is the most obvious form of misrepresentation. For example, in 
Flynn v Scott (1949)296, the verbal statement that a van was “in good running order” was held 
to be a representation. The provision of a technically accurate yet misleading statement is also 
misrepresentation297.  
Appearance of article 
The requirement of a representation that it be a communication of information does not 
necessarily require that it should be in the form of words, as information may be inferred from 
conduct. Conduct capable of conveying information may be non-verbal communication – like 
a “nod or a wink, or a shake of the head, or a smile from the purchaser intending to induce the 
vendor to believe the existence of a non-existent fact”298 – but it may also be simply showing 
an article to the buyer. The outward appearance of an article can be suggestive of its qualities, 
as where an animal is outwardly healthy, or a machine apparently in good working order. In 
these cases, there can be a fine distinction between the purchaser’s self-delusion or 
misapprehension and the seller’s misrepresentation. Generally, it appears that in modern law 
the latter is actionable as misrepresentation and the former is not, amounting only to non-
disclosure in a situation where there is no general duty to disclose. However, while the only 
cases of misrepresentation by appearance to have been reported are cases where articles have 
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been “faked” to look like something they are not, there is no reason why the rule should not 
extend to the sale of goods suffering from latent faults. 
In Patterson v Landsberg & Son (1905)299, the buyer claimed that the seller had led her to 
believe, contrary to the truth, that three articles of “bijouterie” or “vertu” sold to her were 
antique, when in fact they were modern replicas of which the seller was the manufacturer. The 
buyer’s case was framed as an action for misrepresentation. Lord Kincairney considered that 
the deliberate falsehood intended by the seller, and not the buyer’s misapprehension, formed 
the ground of action:  
[…W]hen a seller knows that a buyer is purchasing under a false impression, he 
certainly must take care not to go a step beyond what the law does not prevent. But 
the Lord Ordinary has not proceeded on mere misapprehension, but on active, 
direct, aggressive falsehood, which he finds proved against the defenders, and 
which forms the ground of his judgment.300 
Lord Kyllachy, on the other hand, thought that misrepresentation was evident from the 
appearance of the articles themselves, opining, 
[…T]he appearance of age and other appearances presented by these articles 
constituted by themselves misrepresentations; in short, that the case is really one 
of res ipsa loquitur […]301 
The effect of the decision in Patterson was discussed recently in the Outer House case of Lyon 
& Turnbull Limited v Sabine (2012)302. The facts are similar to the case of Patterson: both 
cases concerned the sale of articles said to be antique, when they were not so; and in both 
cases the seller made an express statement as to the antiquity of the articles. However, the 
facts differed because the buyer in Lyon & Turnbull was an antiques dealer, and had the 
opportunity to inspect the table. Furthermore, in contrast with Patterson, the sellers were not 
the manufacturers of the articles.  
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As the buyer was an antique dealer, Lord Brodie decided that there was no reliance on the 
seller’s verbal statements in deciding whether to enter the contract, and thus – reliance being 
an essential element of the test – no action lay for innocent misrepresentation in respect of 
them. The purchaser suggested that a further misrepresentation was made simply by the seller 
showing the table to the buyer because it had the appearance of being an antique. Lord Brodie 
rejected the idea that actionable innocent misrepresentation could arise from simple silence. 
He said, 
A misrepresentation is of the nature of a statement about something. I accept that 
there are circumstances in which silence can amount to a statement and 
information can be communicated other than by words but essentially a 
representation, and therefore a misrepresentation, is the communication of 
information concerning a thing or a state of affairs.303 (Emphasis added) 
Lord Brodie went on to suggest that the dicta in Patterson as to the effect of the appearance of 
the article could not be used in isolation to found a claim of innocent misrepresentation. He 
said, 
Patterson is a case about modern fabrications sold as antiques or objects of vertu 
by an English dealer to a Scottish dealer and to that extent may be thought to be in 
point. There is however an important difference between Patterson and the present 
case. The defenders in Patterson had had the fabrications made to their order. They 
intended to mislead and did mislead the pursuer. Although not pled explicitly in 
these terms, it was a case of fraud, as was recognised by the court.304 
The law may not yet be settled on this point. Martin Hogg suggests that Lord Brodie’s 
argument represents “an unnecessarily narrow view of the concept of factual information”305. 
He argues that, 
If Lord Kyllachy is correct (which it is suggested he is) that the appearance of 
items can itself constitute a misrepresentation, then the fact that such a 
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misrepresentation is not fraudulent does not lead to the conclusion that it is not a 
misrepresentation.306 
The character of fraud can, on this view, be logically separated from the existence of a 
misrepresentation. If this is correct, then Lyon & Turnbull may not represent good law, and the 
appearance of an article is itself able to constitute a misrepresentation. This view is supported 
by the earlier case of Edgar v Hector (1912)307, where a set of chairs was sold “as antique”, 
when in fact they had been “faked” to look like antique chairs. Although the seller knew the 
article did not possess the quality the buyer believed it had, Lord Mackenzie considered that 
the get-up of the chairs was relevant to the existence of a misrepresentation:  
[…T]he appearance of the chairs cannot be left out of view as an element in the 
case. It cannot be said that the defender had only to look at the chairs in order to 
see that although he was contracting to get one thing he was getting another.308 
McBryde suggests309 that Gibson v National Cash Register Co (1925)310 (again a case where 
the seller knew of the misleading nature of the appearance of his goods) is an example of 
concealment “as an aspect of” misrepresentation. In that case, it was relevant that second-hand 
cash registers had been made to appear new, so that the quality of their being second-hand was 
not immediately discoverable by the purchaser. 
It is concluded that the appearance of an article may thus be considered a misrepresentation, 
where its outward appearance conceals the true state of affairs. This rule could apply to cases 
of sale of faulty goods where the defect is latent, and cannot be determined from inspection, 
which might thus be considered misrepresentation – although it does not appear to have been 
used in this way in the reported cases.  
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When considering whether a misrepresentation is inaccurate or misleading, it must be given a 
“fair construction”311 or its “natural meaning”312 in order to determine the manner of the 
inaccuracy and how it is really misleading. What comprises a “fair construction” of the thing 
represented is dependent on the circumstances of the case313. 
In deciding whether a misrepresentation has been made, there is a suggestion that the price the 
seller is asking can be a relevant to the determination of a ‘fair construction’, but only to the 
extent that it contributes to the error under which the buyer is acting. In Edgar v Hector 
(1912)314, Lord Mackenzie considered that the price paid by the purchaser,  
[…W]as not an unfair price […], and that if the [articles] had been genuine, they 
would have been worth a great deal more. The defender, however, does not seem 
to have been possessed of the necessary knowledge to be aware of this fact.315 
Representation of fact 
As with warrandice, it has been held sales “puff”, expressions of an opinion, and statements of 
intention are not actionable316. 
Inducement 
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Misrepresentation is actionable in modern Scots law where it induces essential error – that is, 
an error that was of such importance that the erring party would have declined to contract if it 
had not been present317. The test is most clearly expressed in the judgment of Lord Carmont in 
Ritchie v Glass (1936)318, where he opined that, 
[…W]hen misrepresentation by a party is alleged inducing error in the other in 
regard to some matter, that matter need not be an essential of the contract, but it 
must be material and of such a nature that not only the contracting party but any 
reasonable man might be moved to enter into the contract; or, put the other way, if 
the misrepresentation had not been made, would have refrained from entering into 
the contract.319  
Misrepresentation as to the existence or non-existence of a fault affecting goods is therefore a 
sufficient basis for a claim of misrepresentation provided that the other party would not have 
bought the goods otherwise. 
Remedies 
The only competent remedy for misrepresentation in Scots law, if not fraudulent or negligent, 
is reduction of the induced agreement, although it appears innocent misrepresentation may 
also be stated as a defence or exception in an action for performance without a conclusion for 
reduction320. If the misrepresentation is fraudulent or negligent, then damages are available in 
addition to reduction of the contract. 
Damages if fraudulent or negligent 
                                                
317 Boyd & Forrest v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co 1914 SC 472 per Lord Guthrie at 518; Lord 
Dundas at 496. 
318 1936 SLT 591. 
319 At 593-4. 
320 Shepherd v Mallon, 1 Nov 2013 (unreported). 
   
  
85 
Before 1985, only a fraudulent or grossly negligent misrepresentation would give rise to a 
claim of damages for inducing contract321. In Boyd & Forrest (1914), Lord Guthrie opined that, 
The law might have recognised three classes of misrepresentation, and might have 
assigned different legal effects and remedies to each, first, fraudulent 
misrepresentation, second, misrepresentation, carless and negligent, but not so 
careless and negligent as to be equivalent to fraudulent misrepresentation, and 
third, innocent misrepresentation, with no element of carelessness or negligence. 
But it was admitted that there is no legal distinction between the second and the 
third, although, in a certain sense, there is fault in the one and not in the other.322 
However, following recommendations from the Scottish Law Commission323, damages were 
made available for inducing another party to contract through negligent misrepresentations.324  
At least after the 1985 Act, it seems that it is unnecessary to show that a duty of care existed in 
order to bring a contractual action for negligent misrepresentation, provided a negligently 
made statement was made by one party to a contract, to the other, which induced the 
contract325.  
Restitutio in integrum 
Reduction of a contract for misrepresentation cannot be successful in modern Scots law 
without the possibility of restitutio in integrum326, i.e. the “mutual unwinding of a voidable 
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contract”327. In the context of the sale of defective goods, issues of restitutio in integrum may 
arise where the goods have deteriorated or no longer exist.  
However, although it depends on the circumstances of the case, it is not always the case that 
restitutio in integrum must be literally possible328 . McBryde suggests329  that Spence v 
Crawford (1939)330 is an example of less literal requirement of restitutio in integrum, but 
notes that the case was one of fraud and that it indicates that a “different standard” may apply 
in cases of unintentional misrepresentation. In that case, Lord Carmont, on an appeal to the 
Inner House, described restitutio in integrum in this way: 
In order to obtain this rescission there must be restitutio in integrum, that is, […] 
he must be able to put the defender back into the position he was in as regards all 
the other material matters provided for in the contract. It has been said, and no 
doubt with accuracy, that the rule must not be taken too literally and as imposing 
on the party seeking to avoid the contract an absolute obligation, in all events, to 
restore the other party fully to his original position.331 
Lord Carmont then goes on to discuss the situations in which restitutio in integrum need not 
be applied in its literal sense332. He concludes that there are two exceptions: firstly, where the 
thing has “deteriorated through its own inherent nature”; and secondly, where deterioration 
results “from the legitimate exercise of the rights given by the contract to the person seeking to 
rescind” 333. Speaking of the first exception, he says, 
[…I]f the thing offered back has deteriorated through its own inherent nature, the 
principle of restitutio in integrum does not operate to prevent the rescission. This 
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idea of deterioration through the inherent nature of the subject seems to apply 
whether the subject is livestock or a business carried on by a partnership.334  
He later alludes to the possibility that there may be an exception to the rigidity of the rule of 
restitutio in integrum in cases of fraud, but expresses no view.335 
The pursuer appealed to the House of Lords. Lord Thankerton, delivering the majority speech, 
considered that Lord Carmont had been too rigid in defining exceptions to the principle, which 
ought not to be applied “too literally”336. 
Furthermore, Lord Wright confirms that cases of fraud will be treated differently to cases of 
innocent misrepresentation for the purposes of the restitutio in integrum requirement. He 
states, 
The Court will be less ready to pull a transaction to pieces where the defendant is 
innocent, whereas in the case of fraud the Court will exercise its jurisdiction to the 
full in order, if possible, to prevent the defendant from enjoying the benefit of his 
fraud at the expense of the innocent plaintiff.337 
It is concluded that, in the context of the sale of defective goods, the requirement of restitutio 
in integrum might pose certain problems for the purchaser. Two observations have been made. 
Firstly, that there is authority for a relaxation of the precise requirements of restitutio in 
integrum in the context of fraud compared to cases of innocent misrepresentation. Secondly, it 
is clear that ‘inherent deterioration’ or deterioration through legitimate use of an article will 
not normally bar a claim of misrepresentation, unless there has been mistreatment of the 
article. 
Damages for innocent misrepresentation when restitutio in integrum impossible? 
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Consequential damages are not normally available in cases of innocent misrepresentation338. 
However, McBryde suggests that damages might be available in exceptional circumstances at 
common law, where the non-recognition of the actio quanti minoris would otherwise leave the 
purchaser without remedy.339 McBryde suggests that this rule was applied, “to hidden defects 
in machinery […] and to a sale of heritage” 340.  
Summary 
The late-19th century saw a doctrine of innocent misrepresentation introduced into Scots law, 
which was doctrinally based in the law of error and theoretically applied to all consensual 
contracts. Thus, after these developments, the buyer of faulty goods might be able to escape a 
contract (or claim damages in certain circumstances) where the seller had made some 
representation about the quality of the goods being sold which induced the buyer to contract.  
In the context of sales of faulty goods, a representation can be a verbal or non-verbal 
communication of information by one party to another party – perhaps little more than silence 
in cases where the appearance of the article is suggestive of that information – but in all cases 
of innocent misrepresentation in modern Scots law it is thought necessary that the 
representation be active on the part of the person making the representation rather than mere 
misapprehension on the part of the buyer.  
Where a representation has been made, it is necessary to give that representation a fair 
construction in order to determine whether it is misleading or inaccurate. There is some 
suggestion that, in cases of sale, the price asked for the article can be an element in 
determining whether there has been a misrepresentation. 
Reduction of the contract is the primary remedy for a misrepresentation, but reduction is only 
available where restitutio in integrum is possible. However, the requirement of restitution in 
integrum does not need to be applied too strictly in appropriate cases. In particular, inherent 
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deterioration of the goods from the fault will not bar a claim for misrepresentation. Where the 
misrepresentation is made fraudulently or negligently, damages will be available. 




This thesis has shown that liability for sale of faulty goods has existed in various forms 
throughout the modern era of Scots law. This liability might be in fraud, or presumed fraud; in 
the terms of the contract; or in error after the recognition of a doctrine of innocent 
misrepresentation. 
During the late-17th and early-18th centuries, liability was about the culpa of the seller in 
selling goods suffering from a fault that he was deemed to know about from the fact that the 
fault hindered the goods for their proper use. For Stair, this was a form of presumed fraud. 
There was no liability for sale of goods for the specific purposes of the buyer, unless the seller 
had made some explicit communication about the suitability of the goods for that purpose. 
Attitudes started to shift in the mid-18th century towards holding the seller liable from an 
implicit or express agreement of the parties, rather than from simple operation of law, which 
coincides with the rise of the will theory of contract law. However, up until the 19th century 
there is still evidence of the seller’s liability arising from fraud. 
From the 19th-century onwards, it is consistently held that liability of the seller for sale of 
faulty goods arises as either an implicit or express condition of their bargain. There is some 
suggestion that the rationale for such a rule is that the parties have not really agreed because 
they are in error, but there is no discussion of this analysis by the courts in the context of the 
sale of goods, and Stein suggests that these cases are really about the conformity of the goods 
with their contractual description rather than their quality or fitness for purpose. 
In 1856, statute destroyed the implied warrandice of quality where the buyer had not bought 
the goods for a specific purpose, provided the seller was ignorant and had not expressly 
warranted the goods. After this event, there is perhaps an increase in the number of cases 
referring to the English doctrine of rejection for non-conformity with contract, but no real 
indication that the courts were struggling to find a new route to a remedy in appropriate cases. 
In 1893, the implied warranty was restored by another statute, which continued to differentiate 
between cases of fitness for an expressed purpose and the general standard of quality. The 
1893 Act was effectively a codification of the English common law, and was restricted to 
cases of sale by description where the seller dealt in the sort of goods at issue. The statutory 
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rules continued to be developed and expanded, until the advent of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Act 1977, which prevented express terms from overriding the implied obligation as to quality, 
thus imposing the terms on the parties despite using the language of implicit agreement. 
At the same time, a doctrine of innocent misrepresentation had been received from English 
law in the context of heritable property. The process of recognition of this doctrine subsumed 
the law of misrepresentation within the law of error, which came to be a distinct category of 
reduction of contracts. Misrepresentation inducing essential error, in the sense of causing the 
buyer to contract, became relevant in cases of sale, especially where the buyer could not rely 
on the contract, or found it advantageous not to do so. Misrepresentation in this context 
includes words and non-verbal communication, but it also includes the simple appearance of 
the article. This latter area of the law is curiously underdeveloped, perhaps owing to the 
success of the statutory regime. 
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